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ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis proved to be an extremely severe and long economical distress in 
the American economy. The crisis did not just entail a housing market crash but ex-
panded into a nationwide recession that nearly caused a systemic crash of the whole US 
financial sector. During the midst of the crisis the US central bank, the Federal Reserve 
came to a conclusion that its conventional monetary tools were not sufficient to solve 
the problems within the economy and initiated a number of monetary easing programs 
that departed from the bank’s conventional policy regime. Among other monetary ac-
tions, the new unconventional tools included many rounds of large-scale asset purchas-
ing programs (quantitative easing) and zero bound interest rate policies. This study fo-
cuses directly into studying the effects of the Fed’s quantitative easing and interest rate 
policies for the US economy after the financial crisis.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the developments of the economical factors 
during 2009 and 2016 that the Fed has informed as its targets to influence through its 
monetary policy. In support of the empirical study, the paper goes through the back-
ground of the crisis and discusses the traditional policy regime of the US central bank. 
In the empirical part of the paper, the developments of the chosen economical factors 
are being compared against the Fed’s asset purchasing data and the developments of the 
Fed’s main directing interest rate. The statistical analysis is conducted using regression 
analysis and vector autoregressive modelling.  
The results of the study confirm that the recovery has been slow in many of the target 
figures the Fed has wanted to influence. The unconventional monetary actions seem to 
have been more effective for adjusting different asset yields but it would appear that the 
Fed’s failure to promote more expansive credit environment in the US might have 
caused the slow recovery in other economical sectors as well.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: financial crisis, the Fed, quantitative easing, zero interest rate policy 
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1. Introduction 
 
The beginning of the financial crisis in the US in 2008 marked a beginning of an era, 
where the whole American economy was facing a number of unprecedented challenges 
that impacted the entire nation’s households, businesses, financial markets and policy 
makers. The deep recession was a product of a real estate boom that had been building 
up from the start of the millennium. However as the housing bubble burst the whole 
economy started recognizing that the soaring real estate market had created a systemic 
financial crisis that entailed an over levered household and financial sectors, where 
mortgage market related securitizing had made the whole economy over exposed for the 
real estate boom. The crash of the US financial sector drove the whole US economy into 
recession that spread on the interrelated financial markets all over the world.  
The crisis struck not the least on the nation’s central bank, the Federal Reserve (Fed). In 
the midst of the crisis the central bank realized that its conventional monetary tools 
were not sufficient enough to tackle the on going economical problems. This led to ini-
tiations of many different new unconventional monetary actions and tools in order to 
help the financial markets and the whole economy to recover. The new unprecedented 
monetary actions included for instance large-scale asset purchasing programs and com-
mitments to very low levels of interest rate guidance. What made the period after the 
bursting of the financial crisis even more unusual for the Fed was the length of the par-
ticularly easy monetary policy regime. During the time after the crisis the central bank 
performed its large-scale asset purchases of different securities for many years and after 
lowering its main directing interest rate to zero, it was kept there for almost six years. 
After almost a decade of slow economic recovering the easy monetary policy is still 
very much in place. The large-scale asset purchases that have significantly increased the 
size of the Fed’s balance sheet and the nation’s monetary base have not yet been re-
versed and the main directing interest rate has only been increased by 0,5 per cent.   
Because the monetary actions in the US after the financial crisis have been so uncon-
ventional and relatively large in historical perspective, it is important to study these pol-
icy actions to understand their nature and affects for the whole economy. For the future 
monetary policy regime, it is essential to comprehend why it has taken almost a decade 
for the policy actions to sufficiently start promoting economic recovery, or have they 
actually been nearly as effective as the central bank would have hoped. Additionally 
despite that the crisis started in the US, the recession quickly spread to other nations all 
around the world, and other central banks have since followed with the same type of 
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unconventional monetary actions to promote higher growth for their economies. The 
imitated monetary actions from the Fed have also been in place in other countries for 
many years, as have the ones in the US and therefore the same type of research for the 
policy regime’s effectiveness is important. Moreover while the US economy has moved 
on a steadier growth path after almost a decade after the recession, it is essential to 
evaluate to unconventional policies for the future economical slowdowns to assess, 
whether it is justified to use these policies again should another recession hit the coun-
tries where these monetary policies have been used.  
The large-scale asset purchasing programs have been studied many times after the crisis 
for instance by Chung (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). These 
researchers have studied how the financial markets and the economy have responded to 
the policy alterations on short-term and evaluated their effectiveness. However mone-
tary policy action’s tend to affect the economy in a lagged pace and the economical 
problems have certainly not only been short-term problems. This is why this paper stud-
ies the time of the US central bank’s unconventional monetary policy as a whole from 
2009 till 2016 to uncover how much merit can be granted for the monetary policy as a 
recovering force for the economy. The aim is to evaluate the Fed’s monetary actions 
effectiveness in affecting the economical factors that the Fed has informed as its targets 
to influence. This can make it possible to evaluate the validation of the Fed’s and other 
central banks’ unconventional monetary policies and offer some insight on their useful-
ness for the future.  
The study starts by discussing on the events that led to the bursting of the real estate 
bubble and the financial crisis in the late 2000’s. By going through the background of 
the bubble, it is easier to understand the different challenges the Fed was facing during 
the crisis and why its conventional policy tools were not sufficient to solve the US 
economy’s issues at the time. The following chapter discusses the Fed more closely as 
an institution and goes through the theoretical regime of its monetary policy. The chap-
ter also goes through some previous recessions in the US, to provide contrast how the 
Fed has adjusted its monetary policy during those distressing times. The fourth chapter 
is dedicated for covering the events during the financial crisis and the Fed’s new uncon-
ventional monetary tools that were initiated during those years. All this is followed by 
the empirical part of the study, which uses statistical analysis methods to study the rela-
tionship of the Fed’s monetary actions and the development of chosen economical fac-
tors based on the Fed’s informed targets it wanted to influence after the financial crisis.  
 
 9 
2. The background of the crisis 
 
The financial crisis will remain in the history as one of the most difficult economic re-
cessions of our time. When the crisis started, the economic problems were unexpected 
and large in historical perspective, but included completely new systemic financial 
problems and economical risks. These new unprecedented economic issues forced the 
Federal Reserve to implement many new monetary policy actions in order to solve the 
acute financial distresses in the system and further help the economy to recover towards 
steady levels of growth. In order to understand thoroughly, why the Fed was forced to 
adjust its policy measures, it is important to examine the background of the crisis to 
understand the full range of the problems, which the central bank had to face during the 
financial crisis.  
 
2.1. Early 2000’s and consumption on debt 
 
According to Bernanke (2012) the build up to the financial crisis started in the early 
2000’s after the technology stock bubble. Even though the stock market crash in 2000 
drove the US economy into a recession, the slowdown was only a mild one and did not 
last long in a historical perspective. In spite of the relatively short economic slowdown, 
the Fed continued to practice easy monetary policy for many years, which it had started 
right away after the stock market crash in 2000. This easy monetary included low levels 
of the central bank’s main directing interest rate, the federal funds rate (Fed Funds 
Rate). The Fed Funds Rate is the central bank’s main tool, which it uses to control li-
quidity within its economy. It defines the interest rate, which private banks use when 
they loan assets for each other over night on their central banks’ reserve accounts. From 
January 2001 all the way to early 2004, the Fed had dropped its Federal funds rate from 
above six per cent to under two per cent where it stayed for over two years. Bernanke 
(2012) states that in addition to the fears the Fed had about weakening consumer confi-
dence after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the central bank wanted to keep the Fed Funds 
Rate low to support the labour market in the early 2000’s. While the central bank was 
still lowering its directing interest rate, economic growth and inflation started to accel-
erate (Goodhart 2008). 
Accelerating economic growth and low levels of interest rates started to create the first 
building blocks for the financial crisis of 2008. Because the inflation rate started grow-
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ing, reaching already two per cent in late 2003, the real interest rates in the economy 
dropped lower and lower. When consumers consider their financial decisions they take 
into account the levels of inflation and real interest rates. When inflation accelerates and 
nominal interest rates stay low, real interest rates keep decreasing, which encourages 
households to consume more instead of saving more out of their income, and take on 
more credit. (Goodhart 2008.) While households in America were starting to demand 
more and more credit on low interest rates, the banking sector was willing to increase 
their supply of credit for this demand, because they were able to loan out affordable 
new funds from their central bank’s reserve accounts on low Fed Funds Rate. (Ala-
Nissilä 2010: 15–16.) 
While the expanding levels of credit and consumption might have been encouraging 
signs for the economy, the problem was that the banking sector started increasing their 
levels of risk in their lending actions. This increasing risk taking was seen especially in 
the banks’ mortgage lending. (Ala-Nissilä 2010: 15–16.) In the early years of the 21st 
century, the banks in the US started decreasing their standards for viable mortgage can-
didates. Before the early 2000’s, it was common that a new applicant for a mortgage 
had to be able to provide a down payment of 10–20 per cent of the house’s sales price to 
be eligible for the loan. Additionally the banks investigated the applicant’s income lev-
els, net worth of their assets and information about their credit history. But as the de-
mand for mortgage loans accelerated and the interest rates stayed low, the banks started 
lowering their down payment demands and reducing background checks for the appli-
cants. This meant that home ownership became possible for a larger portion of the na-
tion, which accelerated the growth of mortgage lending even more. (Bernanke 2012.) 
While homeownership became more and more common, the house prices in America 
started rising rapidly and households started increasing their consumption. As less sol-
vent people became homeowners, households started consuming on credit. (The Finan-
cial Crisis Inquiry Report hw. FCIR 2011: 83–84.) According to Bernanke (2012) the 
increasing consumption was driven by the optimism of the soaring house prices. In fact, 
the house prices had risen by ten per cent per year between 2000 and 2004 and moreo-
ver around 15 per cent per year in 2005 and 2006 (Hellwig 2009: 156.) The strong sen-
timent in the housing markets created a false picture in the consumers’ minds about 
their levels of wealth. Bernanke (2012) describes how the prevalent sentiment during 
those years was that consumers did not put much weight on their income levels as long 
as the price of their houses kept going up. This sentiment empowered households to 
even greater amounts of credit-supported consumption. The Figure 2 illustrates how 
rapidly the housing market grew in the early 2000’s before collapsing.  
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Figure 1. S&P/Casa-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index 1991–2014 
As the house prices kept rising, cash out refinancing became very popular among the 
new homeowners (FCIR 2011: 34). This meant that households did not only spend a 
larger portion of their income on consumption, but wanted to concretely take advantage 
of their risen house prices, by taking out new loans against their house (Bernanke 2012). 
In cash out refinancing, the borrower is offered the possibility to take out a new loan on 
their existing mortgage. For instance, if a household has 80 000 dollars left to pay on 
their mortgage and their house’s market price is 200 000 dollars, their house’s equity is 
equal to 120 000 dollars. In this situation the household can utilize refinancing and take 
out a new loan against their house’s equity. If the loan amount exceeds 80 000 dollars, 
the household can take out this extra amount of capital as cash for consumption. (The 
Federal Reserve Board 2008.)  
While the house prices kept soaring, refinancing seemed like a safe and rational way for 
households to increase their purchasing power (Bernanke 2012). The popularity of refi-
nancing loans grew substantially. In 2000 American households took out refinancing 
loans for 460 billion dollars, but by the end of 2003, the total worth of refinancing grew 
to 2,8 trillion dollars. (FCIR 2011: 34.) People utilized their new excess purchasing 
power and bought new cars, luxury items and renovated their homes. Bernanke (2012) 
points out that in addition to this dangerous phenomenon of excessive consumption 
through debt, people also started to use their refinancing cash as collateral for new 
loans. While the housing market seemed steady and profitable, people also used their 
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refinancing cash as down payments for new homes they bought as investments. This 
accelerated the demand for homes even more and allowed the housing market bubble to 
grow even larger. By the spring of 2004 69,2 per cent of US citizens were homeowners. 
In 2005 ten per cent of all house acquisitions were made by financial institutions or by 
people buying their second home. 2006 marked the peak for the mortgage markets, as 
Americans borrowed 334 billion dollars in mortgage loans, seven times more than in 
1996. (FCIR 2011: 34.)  
While Americans were increasing their consumption, their real incomes did not follow 
with the same pace (FCIR 2011: 34).  Figure 2 illustrates the development of US house-
holds’ consumption and real income. From figure 2 it can be seen that while the income 
levels decreased during 2000 and 2003, Americans still increased their consumption 
during the early 2000’s. As the consumption increase was at its peak at above six per 
cent in 2004 and 2005, American households still only earned as much or one per cent 
more as they did in the previous year. This strengthens the fact how the increasing con-
sumption had to be filled by credit, since households’ income levels were not sufficient 
to sustain their consumption expenditures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. US households personal consumption and real median income 
 
 13 
 2.2. Financial markets 
 
As the housing markets in the US kept booming and households continued to exploit the 
souring house prices by increasing their levels of debt and consumption, entities in the 
financial sector started to utilize the developments within the economy as well. Low 
interest rates and the accelerating growth in the mortgage market started to generate 
more leveraging in the banking sector and new mortgage related securities were intro-
duced to the markets.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, mortgage lenders started to ease their require-
ments for mortgage lending in the early 2000’s. Because home owning became more 
and more popular the market for standard mortgage loans was saturating. But since the 
housing market kept going up, increasing mortgage lending was still in the banking sec-
tor’s interest. As a solution for the saturating mortgage market, the banking sector start-
ed to increase their mortgage lending by offering home loans for a broader population. 
This happened through a rise in so-called sub prime lending. Sub prime mortgages were 
loans where the banks did not require as high standards from the mortgage applicant as 
they did with their standard home loans. For instance the applicants’ capital and credit 
score requirements were lower and the payment plans were not as strict as they were in 
regular mortgage lending. Sub prime lending became a popular business in the Ameri-
can banking sector and the banks increased their risks and exposure in the housing mar-
kets. (Bernanke 2012.) 
Hellwig (2009) explains, that the soaring housing markets were the biggest incentive for 
the banking sector to increase their levels of risk through sub prime lending. Tradition-
ally mortgage lending is a stable and a low-risk business for the banking sector. Con-
ventionally the banks thoroughly check the mortgage applicant’s backgrounds and fi-
nancials during the application process and the house usually serves as a guarantee for 
the debt. As the borrower pays back the debt, he also pays interest, which is the banks’ 
profit from the loan. Mortgage interest payments are traditionally low risk cash flows 
for a bank, which it uses to finance its other financial operations. If the house owner 
were to default on his mortgage, the house would become property of the bank. (Federal 
Trade Commission 2016.) When the banks increased their levels of risks through sub 
prime lending, it became more probable that more loans in their mortgage portfolios 
would convert into houses on the banks’ balance sheets in case of increasing defaults. 
But as the market prices were soaring continuously, the banks were confident that they 
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could simply sell the houses they had to repossess through possible mortgage defaults 
and make a profit from the soared market price. (Bernanke 2012.) 
The possibility to offset the risk derived from sub prime lending by souring house mar-
kets, increased sub prime lending significantly in the beginning of the 21st century. 
Since 2000, the portion of sub prime loans grew form nine per cent to 40 per cent out of 
all mortgage loans. (Hellwig 2009.) Bernanke (2012) also points out that as the sub 
prime market grew larger, the minimum requirements for receiving a sub prime loan 
decreased. For instance between 2001 and 2006 the portion of the sub primes where the 
required down payment was less than ten per cent of the house’s market value grew 
from five to 14 per cent. Loans where banks mandated few or no background checks at 
all increased from seven per cent to 18 per cent out of all loans. On average sub prime 
loans required a six per cent down payment and half of the sub prime applicants enjoyed 
lower standards of background checking.  (International Monetary Fund 2007.) 
Hellwig (2009) describes how the increased profits derived from sub prime lending op-
erations started to raise the interest of investment bankers and other investors. Since the 
interest rate levels were still low during the early 2000’s due to the Federal Reserves’ 
monetary easing, investors were seeking earning opportunities elsewhere than from the 
bond markets. This was creating an increasing demand for alternative securities and the 
mortgage lenders saw an opportunity to satisfy this demand. The mortgage lenders who 
had been increasing their conventional and sub prime lending started to bundle their 
separate mortgages together and securitizing them.  
Securitization of mortgage loans by the banks meant that they started creating new fi-
nancial products based on the cash flows derived form the loans. This way they were 
able to lower their total exposure to the housing market and turn their risky sub prime 
loan portfolios to cash by selling them forward for other investors. (Hellwig 2009.) 
These securitized products made out of mortgage loans are called mortgage-backed-
securities (MBS). A creation of an MBS-product meant that the mortgage brokers gath-
ered loans out of their mortgage portfolios together into a security, where the cash flows 
for the investor came from the original house owners interest and loan payments on the 
mortgage. The house behind the mortgage served as the guarantee for the security, 
hence the title mortgage-backed-security. (Securitites and Exchange Commission 
2014a.) These products became popular among investment bankers in the early 2000’s. 
They bought them both as investments for them selves and brokered them forward to 
other entities as well.  
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According to Pickert (2008), a large portion of the MBS selling were done by the two 
largest mortgage brokers in America, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Originally these 
companies were government-established entities, whose purpose was to support the 
domestic real estate market and to enable home owning for families in the US. They did 
this by purchasing mortgage loans from private banks to release new capital, which the 
banks could lend forward to new home loan applicants.  Fannie Mae was privatized in 
1968 and Freddie Mac in 1989, because the debt burden of these two companies had 
grown too large for the government to maintain.  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were active entities in the creation of the MBS-markets 
already before the 21st century. Traditionally the mortgages they bought had to meet 
high standards and the solvency level of the household behind the mortgage had to sat-
isfy tight criteria. After buying the mortgages Fannie and Freddie guaranteed the loans 
them selves and sold them forward for investors as MBSs. These MBSs were treated as 
very safe investments, because the markets saw Fannie and Freddie as stable and sol-
vent companies due to their government background, even though they had been privat-
ized decades before the creation of the MBS-market. (Hellwig 2009.) 
The turn of the century brought changes to Fannie Mae’s and Freddy Mac’s business 
models, when George W. Bush’s government started promoting home ownership for a 
larger part of the economy. The government started pressuring Fannie and Freddie into 
buying sub prime loans as well as traditional high-class loans in order to add pressure 
for the private mortgage brokers to provide more sub prime loans as well. (Hellwig 
2009; Overdose 2012.) The sub prime loans Fannie and Freddie bought in the early 
2000’s were bundled together as MBSs’ and sold for investors. Hellwig (2009) de-
scribes that investors had a very high interest for the MBSs created by these two enti-
ties, because the investors still considered Fannie and Freddie as government related 
agencies with a small chance for solvency issues.  
Now investment banks were buying MBSs form separate private banks as well as form 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As the MBS portfolios grew larger, investment banks 
developed the mortgage-related financial market further by creating new securities from 
the MBSs called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Typically a CDO was built by 
gathering hundreds of MBSs together into a one security, which was divided into sepa-
rate tranches. The tranches were classified by their level of risk, defined by the credit 
ratings of the mortgages that belonged into the tranche. The riskier a tranche was, the 
higher was the expected return from that tranche for the investor. By gathering lots of 
mortgages with different credit ratings into the CDO, they were able to lower the riski-
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ness of the whole security. As the CDOs were diversified with portions of different 
credit rated mortgages, the banks were able to mitigate the risk that all the mortgages in 
the CDO would go into default and turn the security’s value to zero. (FCIR 2011.) The 
CDO’s diversified risk characterization made them a popular and profitable product for 
the investment banks to sell.  
In addition to the creation of the CDOs, a product called a credit default swap (CDS) 
became popular in the US financial markets. CDSs were financial derivatives that 
worked as insurance products for investors that generated cash flows if the underlying 
asset of the CDS failed. CDSs became popular products for CDO-investors, who want-
ed to hedge them selves against possible defaults in the CDO’s underlying mortgages. 
While the sentiment remained strong in the US real estate market, insurance companies 
and investment banks were willing to sell large amounts of CDS insurances for inves-
tors. As long as the underlying assets did not go into default, the sellers of the CDSs 
collected transaction fees and premiums from the CDS trades generating growing cash 
flows while the housing market was still on the rise. (Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion 2014b.) Ala-Nissilä (2010: 17) emphasizes that the CDS markets entailed some 
dangerous developments within them in contrast to the traditional CDS framework. The 
traditional model was that the person buying a CDS owned the underlying asset as well. 
As the markets moved closer to the beginning of the financial crisis of 2008, the CDS 
markets had become more complex, because investors were buying CDSs for speculat-
ing purposes for underlying assets they did not even own them selves. Ala-Nissilä 
(2010) describes this scenario similar to a person buying an insurance on their relative’s 
or their friend’s house.  
While house prices rose by 27 per cent between 2003 and 2007, the banks created and 
sold four trillion dollars worth in MBSs and 700 billion dollars more in CDOs derived 
from those MBSs (FCIR 2011). CDOs appeared as safe investments in the eyes of the 
public and the possibility to hedge against default risks through CDSs supported the 
demand for CDO’s even further. Hellwig (2009) describes how the false sense of safety 
about the housing markets and about the products derived from them was one of the 
major reasons behind the real estate bubble. On top of the prevalent optimism and in-
coming profits, the US rating agencies have been criticized for their poor standards in 
their rating of MBSs and CDOs, which according to Goodhart (2008) and Hellwig 
(2009) has likely played a major role in the build up for the financial crisis.   
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2.3. The crisis begins 
 
The beginning of 2006 marked the turning point for the US economy, when first signs 
of vulnerabilities within the system started revealing themselves. All of the develop-
ments discussed in the previous chapters, such as overconsumption, high amounts of 
debt and complexity of the financial markets had formed a chain of events that were 
heading towards overheating within the economy.  
According to FCIR (2011), the first signs of overheating were seen in the housing mar-
kets. In the spring of 2006 the number of homes sold per month started decreasing and 
the average time it took to sell a new home reached its highest level during the on going 
decade. Bernanke (2012) states that the market prices of the real estate market had 
simply grown too high at that point for the average household. And as the Federal Re-
serve had started tightening its interest rate policies, the combination of high market 
prices and relatively high interest rates prevented the housing boom to continue any 
further.   
In addition to the demising demand, the house prices started declining due to the in-
creased supply on the markets. The increased supply of new houses derived from the 
rising default rates on mortgage loans. In 2006 more and more households started hav-
ing troubles on making payments on their mortgages. Especially these troubles started 
to occur in the sub prime portion of the house loans. (Mayer, Pence & Sherlund 2009.) 
Rising mortgage defaults meant that the underlying houses of these loans were becom-
ing property of the banks that had originated the loans. (Overdose 2012.)  In a conven-
tional situation, the portion of mortgage defaults for a bank is very small and the bank 
usually can off set its losses from the default by selling the property on the markets. 
Now the situation was different, because mortgage default rates started accelerating 
rapidly. (FCIR 2011: 215.) 
Firstly the rising default rates meant that banks were no longer receiving cash flows 
from the mortgages. Another problem was that now more and more mortgages were 
turning into empty houses on the markets owned by banks or other investors. This 
meant that supply of empty homes increased substantially on the markets while the de-
mand for new homes was decreasing at the same time. This eventually led into a price 
crash in the housing markets in 2006. As the house prices declined the banks who now 
had become owners of the defaulted mortgage homes could not sell them at a price that 
would have been even close to the value of the original mortgage. On the other hand 
even if the banks were willing to sell the properties at a loss, the demand for houses was 
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weakening, which made this option difficult as well. (FCIR 2011: 215–17.) Figure three 
illustrates the connection between rising mortgage delinquencies and home price devel-
opment. Figure three shows how the blue curve illustrating the national home price in-
dex reaches its peak in 2006 just before the red curve of mortgage delinquencies hikes 
significantly.  
Figure 3. Development of house prices and mortgage delinquencies in the US 
Rising delinquency rates and the price crash in the housing markets started causing li-
quidity problems for the US banking sector during 2007 (Bernanke 2012). Mishkin 
(2010) describes this development as the “first phase” of the financial crisis that oc-
curred at the end of the decade. As mortgages converted into houses and house prices 
crashed, the financial products derived from them failed as well. The MBSs and CDOs 
that relied on the cash flows from mortgage and interest payments did not generate any 
profit anymore and their values dropped significantly on the markets. The CDS-
insurance products were another liquidity problem for the entities that had sold them as 
well. The CDS sellers simply had not prepared them selves with enough liquidity for a 
market wide crash in the CDO market, and their assets were not sufficient for making 
payments for all of the investors who had bought CDSs from them. (Bernanke 2012.) In 
many cases banks were simultaneously owners of CDOs and sellers of CDS derivatives 
for those CDOs as well. These developments caused liquidity problems for the whole 
US banking sector. The banks could not use valueless MBS securities as guarantees for 
new loans anymore or sell them for other entities either. Trust between financial entities 
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started deteriorating significantly. This was a serious problem because in order to keep 
their short-term liquidity sufficient, banks need to be able to loan short-term assets from 
one another. Now the whole banking sector was struggling with mortgage related secu-
rities and the complexity of the security market raised the levels of uncertainty, which 
eventually led to a “credit crunch” within the financial sector. (Mishkin 2010; Mizen 
2008.) 
By the beginning of 2008 losses in sub prime related financial products were estimated 
around 500 billion dollars (Mishkin 2010). The lack of trust and liquidity within the 
financial sector started generating dangerous phenomena. The first concrete following 
of the credit crunch was seen in March 2008, when Bear Stearns, one of the largest in-
vestment banks in the country failed. Bear Stearns was the first big bank in the US, 
whose liquidity problems grew so large, that it could not operate on a daily basis any-
more. The lack of trust in the financial sector meant that no other entity was willing to 
by its short –or long-term assets, which Bear Stearns would have needed in order to 
manage its daily operations. (Mizen 2008.) 
By this stage the Federal Reserve decided to intervene in order to prevent further un-
wanted developments in the financial sector, and brokered the selling of Bear Stearns to 
another investment bank, JP Morgan/Chase. This action by the central bank relieved the 
on going panic within the financial sector and restored trust in the markets. During the 
spring of 2008 interbank interest rates decreased back to their average levels before the 
problems of Bear Stearns and the worst credit crunch was relieved from the markets. 
(Bernanke 2012.) Mishkin (2010) describes how the prevalent sentiment by the summer 
of 2008 was optimistic and markets saw that the worst was already behind. The finan-
cial crisis would however burst on its full scale later on in 2008, when the fourth largest 
investment bank in the country, Lehman Brothers went into bankruptcy on September 
15. Mishkin (2010) describes the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother as the beginning of the 
“second phase” of the financial crisis.  
“The second phase” of the financial crisis described by Mishkin (2010) begun when 
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy due to its too large debt burden and delinquency 
problems. Lehman was unable to settle its debt positions with any other American bank, 
and no other bank in or outside of the US was willing to acquire Lehman to solve the 
issue as had happened earlier in the year with Bear Stearns. The Federal Reserve tried to 
reach a settlement with other US banks during the weekend before Lehman’s bankrupt-
cy, but no entity was willing to take Lehman’s debt burden on their own balance sheet. 
In Lehman’s case the Federal Reserve was not willing to intervene with the markets 
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either as it had in the case of Bear Sterns where the Fed had taken some of Bear’s debt 
burden under its own balance sheet in order to get JP Morgan/Chase to buy the bank. 
(FCIR 2011.) The Fed was not willing to take on more bad securities and loans on its 
balance sheet and according to Mishkin (2010), it wanted to make a statement for other 
large banks as well that the central bank was not going to reward entities for excessive 
risk taking and bail every struggling bank out. Failed negotiations for structuring a bail 
out solution led to Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy on September 15 2008.  
Effects of Lehman’s bankruptcy were instant on the financial markets. Bernanke (2012) 
states that the world’s largest insurance company AIG was the first and largest sufferer 
of Lehman’s bankruptcy. AIG had participated heavily in the CDS markets and had sold 
CDSs for more than 400 billion dollars. When Lehman filed for bankruptcy AIG started 
having instant liquidity problems when investors were demanding money from Leh-
man’s failed securities for which they owned CDSs against. The shock of Lehman’s 
bankruptcy was too high for AIG’s short-term liquidity and AIG would have needed 
significant aid from other market operators in order to withstand its current situation. 
Trust for AIG’s health was too weak in the markets and the insurance company was not 
able to gather enough funding to withstand its liquidity problems. On September 16th, 
just a day after Lehman’s bankruptcy, the Fed granted an 85 billion dollar loan for AIG, 
in order to avoid its complete failing. (FCIR 2011.) 
Lehman’s bankruptcy and AIG’s problems drove the whole US financial system into a 
state of panic. The bankruptcy of the nation’s fourth largest investment bank and the 
problems of the world’s largest insurance company proved, that no financial entity was 
too big to fail anymore. Every bank on Wall Street had participated in the same mort-
gage related market that had bankrupted Lehman, and no one knew who had taken larg-
est amounts of risk and was next in line to fail. This uncertainty caused a state of com-
plete lack of trust between the financial entities and availability of liquidity froze up 
again even more than it had earlier in that same year. The values of MBS and CDO se-
curities, that had driven Lehman into bankruptcy, collapsed since every entity in the 
market was trying to get rid of them at the same time. Availability of credit was gone, 
because mortgage related securities were not eligible as guarantees for new loans any-
more. The lack of trust between banks reflected to private lending as well, as lending for 
households and private corporations froze up too. The recession that had started from 
the declining housing markets in 2006 had now escalated into a nation wide financial 
crisis. (Mishkin 2010.) 
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2.4. Comparisons to other economic crises 
 
After the collapse of mortgage-related securities market the whole US economy drifted 
into a financial crisis, to which the government and the central bank had to respond ag-
gressively. The actions the Federal Reserve took were sizable on a historical perspective 
and partly completely unseen before. In order to understand the reasons behind the 
monetary actions taken by the Fed, it is suitable to compare to characteristics of this 
crisis into other times in history, where different economical recessions have occurred 
in different economies.  
A rapid rise in some asset class valuation and optimism derived from it, such as the 
housing market in the financial crisis, have been a common characteristic in the history 
as well that has preceded a recession. During the technology bubble in the turn of the 
21st century the prevailing sentiment was extremely optimistic about the rise of the 
technology sector in the US, which led to a rapid rise and fall of the stock market. The 
stock market crash eventually caused a short recession in the US economy. Price bub-
bles caused by over optimism have been seen also in the Netherlands during the so 
called “Tulip mania” and during the great depression in the US in the 1930’s, when cor-
porate stock ownership became more common among the public. (Trueman 2014.) In 
the financial crisis the overheated asset class was real estate, which relates directly to 
household consumption and consumer confidence. Public infrastructure such as educa-
tion, security and healthcare are based on habitation, which means a crash in real estate 
has direct and large multiplying effects on a whole economy level. (FCIC 2011.) An-
other unique characteristic of the financial crisis was the linkage between the securities 
market and the real estate market. In the financial crisis there was not just a crash in 
single asset class, but a systemic slowdown occurred due to the financial sector’s high 
exposure for the real estate market.  
Another typical characteristic behind a recession is an unendurable rise in levels of debt, 
which occurred also in the early 2000’s before the financial crisis. High levels of debt 
were a problem as well in the 1920’s in the US before the great depression. Back then 
the technological development of agriculture was forcing entrepreneurs to invest in new 
equipment to keep up with the competition. This compelled them to take on large 
amounts of debt to cover the new investments. Eventually when the value of owned 
land decreased in the great depression many farmers were caught in a debt trap and un-
employment rose significantly. (Mishkin 2000: 231; Trueman 2014.) What was prob-
lematic in the financial crisis was that the risen levels of debt were associated with the 
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housing market, which only generated overconsumption, speculation and risks. In the 
1920’s part of the debt problem related to investments in agriculture, which promoted 
attempts to increase productivity, not just speculation as was the case with the housing 
bubble.  
Long periods of cheap money due to low levels of interest rates associates itself with 
many recessions in the past as well as it did in the early 2000’s. This has been seen in 
the past for instance in Japan and in Finland.  As the banks increased their lending oper-
ations in the US in the early 2000’s, banks in Japan acted in a similar fashion in the 
1980s when they started increasing their lending for real estate and construction sectors. 
The expansion in credit supply was derived from low interest rate environment in Japan 
as well and was associated with rising real estate values too. (Vanhala 2009.) In Finland 
the international money markets were liberalised in the 1980s, which enabled Finnish 
banks to expand their foreign credit operations. During those years the interest rate en-
vironment was lower in Germany than it was in Finland, which encouraged Finnish 
banks to loan out interbank funding from Germany and lend that money forward for 
Finnish households. This caused an expansion of credit levels among Finnish consum-
ers, which caused a hike in the price levels of the Finnish real estate market. Eventually 
when the interest rate levels rose in Japan and in Finland, the grown asset price bubbles 
burst and both economies fell into recessions. (Kiander 2001: 15–16.) While the real 
estate bubble burst was similar in the US to what happened in Japan and in Finland, the 
American financial sector had become highly exposed for the real estate market and the 
complexity of the financial products and the systemic risk they had caused eventually 
caused more complex issues for policy makers to solve. 
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3. The Federal Reserve 
 
Before examining the Federal Reserve’s actions and policy responses to the financial 
crisis, it is suitable to take a closer look into the Fed’s traditional role as a monetary 
policy governing entity. To build a comprehensive understanding of the Fed’s opera-
tions, this chapter takes a brief look into the central bank’s history and its original pur-
pose, structure and basic monetary tools. Therefore it is easier to understand what 
changed in the Fed’s monetary policy after the financial crisis and what were the rea-
sons behind the new policy tools.  
 
3.1. Founding of the Federal Reserve and its structure 
 
Mishkin (2000: 181–182) states that before the 20th century there was still significant 
amounts of resistance among policymakers against centralized conduct of monetary 
policy. Having one central bank for the whole nation was a negative thought among the 
general public as well. According to Mishkin (2000) the public was afraid that a central 
bank would be too vulnerable to the influence of the nation’s large banking institutions, 
and did not feel there was a need for a banks’ bank that could intervene to the function-
ality of the free markets. This prevalent sentiment was changing however in the turn of 
the 19th and the 20th century, when times of economical slowdown were causing more 
and more bank runs. These bank runs, where people rushed to withdraw their cash from 
their accounts, were causing serious liquidity issues for the nation’s banks and the fi-
nancial system’s health was deteriorating. The problems caused by the bank runs even-
tually convinced the politicians and the public that there was a need for an entity, that 
could provide additional liquidity during recessions and serve as the lender of last re-
sort. To serve this need, the Federal Reserve System was founded by the US congress in 
1913. (Mishkin 2000: 181–182.)  
The Federal Reserve System was founded to maintain a flexible currency, to serve as a 
bank supervisor and to act as a liquidity provider for the US economy (The Federal Re-
serve Board 2013: 15). The Federal Reserve System was defined to consist of 12 re-
gional central banks, an open market committee and a governing council, The Federal 
Reserve Board.  The 12 regional banks were made responsible of bank supervision and 
issuance of currency. The regional central banks act also as the bank for the US treas-
ury. (The Federal Reserve Board 2013: 3–6.) The ownership of the regional central 
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banks is partially divided between governmental authority and the private sector. The 
private banks that are part owners of their regional central banks belong to the Federal 
Reserve System as well. Nowadays the three largest regional central banks by assets are 
Chicago’s, San Francisco’s and New York’s Federal Reserves, whose assets stand for 
over 50 per cent of the whole Federal Reserve System. The most important of these 
three is the New York Fed, whose assets cover around 25 per cent over the whole sys-
tem. New York Fed’s chairman is the only chairman who has a permanent seat at the 
open market committee. (Mishkin 2000: 184.) 
Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors is responsible for the supervision of the regional 
banks. The Board of Governors consists of seven board members. Aside from supervi-
sion, the Board also defines the reserve requirements for all commercial banks and ac-
counts for the interest rate of the Fed’s discount lending. The chairman, which the 
Board of Governors select is a very influential political figure in the US and also serves 
as an advisor for the nation’s president. One term for the chairman lasts for four years. 
The Board of Governors has a very active role in the US monetary policy and all of the 
seven members also serve in the Fed’s open market committee. Five other members in 
the committee are the New York Fed chairman and four other regional Federal Reserve 
chairmen. The open market committee decides on the most important aspect of the 
Fed’s monetary policy, the supply of money. The committee affects the supply of mon-
ey by purchasing and selling long term securities, adjusting its reserve requirements and 
altering its discount lending interest rate. (Mishkin 2000: 183–189; The Federal Reserve 
Board 2013.) 
 
3.2. The Federal Reserve’s traditional monetary policy 
 
Currently the Fed’s three main goals it tries to reach through its monetary policy are 
maintaining steady price levels, maximum employment and reasonable levels of long-
term interest rates. To reach these goals, the Fed uses three main monetary policy tools. 
The most important monetary tool are banks’ reserve requirements, discount lending 
and open market operations. By using these tools the Fed aims to achieve the most effi-
cient results in accordance to its monetary goals and to smoothen out economical cy-
cles. (Board of Governors 2016; Mishkin 2000.) 
The Fed’s reserve requirements are a direct linkage between the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem and the financial sector. These requirements command the amounts of assets that 
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private banks are required to hold on their reserve accounts at their local Federal Re-
serve Bank. These reserves are an important source of short-term liquidity for private 
banks, which they lend out for each other between their reserve accounts. The interest 
rate used for these transactions is the Federal Funds Rate (Fed Funds Rate). The Fed 
Funds Rate, which the open market committee is responsible of, is a significant factor 
for the availability of extra liquidity for the financial sector. Therefore adjustments to 
the Fed Funds Rate directly affects to the liquidity levels in the financial sector, which 
then affects the short –and long terms market interest rates, value of the dollar and the 
stock markets. This chain reaction is a very significant factor in the central banks’ oper-
ations, and therefore changes and future expectations of the Fed Funds Rate are an im-
portant driver for the financial markets and the whole economy. (The Federal Reserve 
Board 2013.) 
When the Fed decides on its main directing interest rate, the Fed Funds Rate, it does not 
actually set out a certain fixed rate for it. The Fed actually reports a target range where 
it wants the interest rate to fluctuate within and it has to make adjustments to its policy 
tools in order to get the Fed Funds Rate within the boundaries it wants it to be. As said 
before, the Fed Funds Rate serves as the interest rate for transactions between private 
banks on their reserve accounts. Therefore when the Fed wants to alter its main direct-
ing interest rate, it can affect it by making adjustments to its reserve requirements for 
private banks. The reserve requirements represent a certain percentage of a private 
bank’s assets that it is required to deposit on its reserve account at its local Federal Re-
serve. Therefore when the Fed changes these reserve requirements, it affects the de-
mand and supply of cash on the reserve accounts markets between private banks. 
(Mishkin 2000: 209–210.) 
For instance, if the Fed aims to decrease private banks’ lending for households in order 
to decelerate inflation, it can increase its reserve requirements for the banking sector. 
This means lower levels of liquidity for private banks when they have to deposit excess 
reserve to their regional central bank. Therefore in order to fill up this missing liquidity, 
the banks start to demand more cash on the reserve account markets from other banks. 
The rising demand of reserve cash causes the interest rate on them to rise, which is the 
Federal Funds Rate. Moreover when the Fed Funds Rate rises and reserve cash becomes 
more expensive for private banks, they have to make up for the deficit by transferring 
the rise of the Fed Funds Rate into their own lending interest rates. This makes borrow-
ing less desirable for households and businesses and therefore causes pressure for infla-
tion rise to calm down. This chain of events is part of conventional conduct of monetary 
policy. However it illustrates how the Federal Reserve does not just simply set out a 
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new level for its main directing interest rate, but it has to put in effort in order to move 
the rate within its desirable window.  
Second of the Fed’s three policy tools is its discount lending operations. In practise it 
means private banks’ direct lending from their regional central bank. In these operations 
the Fed uses a different interest rate than the Fed Funds Rate. The discount lending pro-
gram is called the Discount Window, and it is mainly meant to be used during times of 
economical distress. However alterations to the supply of discount lending and its inter-
est rate have significant effects to the Fed Funds Rate as well so it still is an important 
part of the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy. (Mishkin 2000: 212–213.) For example if 
the Fed decides to increase the supply of discount loans and lowers their interest rates, 
the Discount Window becomes more attracting source of cash for private banks. When 
banks start to increase their discount borrowing, the borrowed assets are transferred into 
their reserve accounts at the central bank, increasing their supply, which puts on pres-
sure for the Fed Funds Rate to decrease.  
The third monetary tool the Fed utilizes is its open market operations. Open market op-
erations are the Fed’s main tool that it uses to control the supply of money within the 
US economy. In practice these operations mean purchases and sellings of bonds and 
securities. Open market operations could in principal be targeted to any type of asset 
classes, but in order for them to be efficient and affective, the Fed usually targets these 
operations to highly liquid short-term asset classes that have low transaction costs. In 
addition with the aim to control the money supply within the economy, the open market 
operations are an important tool for the Fed to affect the Fed Funds Rate as well. This 
effect is achieved because when the Fed buys or sells securities, the transactions happen 
between the reserve accounts at the regional central banks and therefore affects the Fed 
Funds Rate as well. (The Federal Reserve Board 2013.) Typically the open market op-
erations are targeted to US government bonds, because their markets are the largest and 
most liquid markets among all asset classes in America. This means that the Fed’s open 
market operations do not affect or interfere with the price levels of the bond markets. In 
addition to the bond transactions, the Fed also trades a lot with so called repurchase 
agreements (repos). Repos are very short-term loan agreements, which the Fed uses to 
make small adjustments to the supply of cash on the reserve accounts markets. This 
enables the Fed to keep the Fed Funds Rate in control on a daily basis within its desired 
fluctuation range. (Mishkin 2003: 178–180.) 
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3.3. Federal Reserve’s actions during past recessions 
 
Even though central banks use monetary policy tools to smoothen out economical cy-
cles and to promote steady growth, history has shown that economies have faced times 
of recessions and even depressions despite the existence of centralized monetary policy 
authorities. As have central banks around the world, so has the Fed many times 
launched aggressive monetary actions during economical slowdowns to help its domes-
tic markets to recover towards new growth paths. In the past actions within the Fed’s 
traditional policy regime have been sufficient to help its economy recover and conven-
tional monetary has been seen as an efficient tool to solve economical problems during 
recessions. The financial crisis of 2008 proved to be the first recession where traditional 
monetary policy framework was not adequate any more to solve all of the problems the 
economy was facing and the policy actions that took place were significantly apart from 
the conventional regime. In order to comprehensively understand the contrast of the 
new monetary actions during the financial crisis, it is appropriate to briefly look into 
some previous recessions in America and examine the Fed’s reactions to them.  
Since its foundation, the Federal Reserve faced its first significant challenge in the late 
1920’s, when the US stock market started showing signs of overheating. In the 1920’s 
stock investing had become more and more popular among common citizens and bank-
ing regulation had been liberated significantly. This had lead to a strong upward trend in 
the stock markets and the prevalent sentiment was positive about the continuation of the 
stock boom. As the stock price bubble grew larger the Fed was considering tightening 
its discount-lending program in order to calm down the securities market hike. Regard-
less of the heating stock markets, Mishkin (2003: 231–232) states that the Fed did not 
tighten the program, because it was too concerned that it would cause negative effects to 
private bank lending for businesses, and the tightening was postponed till the August of 
1929. At that point the stock boom had already formed a bubble and a hike in the dis-
count lending interest rate was not sufficient to calm the market crash down, but it actu-
ally worsened the circumstances for households and businesses while the recession was 
beginning. (Mishkin 2010.) 
So as Mishkin (2010) states, the Fed’s monetary policy was too easy before the Great 
Depression and did not prevent the overheating of the markets. During the recession, the 
Fed also took a passive role in its policies. When the stock market crashed, it caused a 
panic among citizens and significant amounts of bank runs, which eventually led to over 
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30 per cent of the commercial banks in the US filing for bankruptcy during the reces-
sion. Even though the banking sector was struggling with significant liquidity problems, 
the Fed decided not to take its assumed role as the lender of last resort to help the suf-
fering banks. Mishkin (2003) states that the Fed did not fully understand how the bank 
bankruptcies would affect to the supply of funding in the financial markets. According 
to Mishkin, the central bank saw the bankruptcies more as an unfortunate result of the 
depression, but not as a factor that would deepen the slowdown even more. All together 
Mishkin sees the Fed’s role before and during the Great Depression as quite passive.  
After the years of depression, the Second World War affected the monetary independ-
ency of the Fed, when the US government started issuing substantial amounts of bonds 
to fund its wartime operations. In order for the government to afford these high levels of 
new debt, the Fed agreed to hold the market interest rates at a relatively low level. To 
achieve this the Fed utilized its open market operations and started purchasing securities 
form the markets. After the war had ended the Fed kept holding the market rates at a 
low level, which was possible due to low pressures for interest rates to rise after the 
war. (Mishkin 2000.) The time of low interest rates was cut short by the Korean War in 
1950. Beginning of another war gave pressure for market interest rates to rise and the 
Fed was forced to increase the supply of money in order to keep the market interest 
rates in its control. The rapid increase in money supply resulted an unwanted rise in 
inflation during 1950 and 1951. The accelerating inflation made it impossible for the 
Fed to keep its promise for the US government to keep market interest rates low and the 
Fed ended up taking back its full autonomy of its conduct of monetary policy. (Mishkin 
2000: 232–233.) The redeeming of the Fed’s full autonomy was agreed in the Treasury 
Fed Accord –contract in 1951. The contract enabled the Fed to tighten its monetary pol-
icy quickly and decelerate inflation through hikes in the Fed Funds Rate. The Fed how-
ever agreed to prevent sudden and rapid interest rate hikes in the future for the govern-
ment. The contract specified the Fed’s new policy objectives to include targeting maxi-
mum employment and low inflation levels. (Fed of Philadelphia 2014.) 
The Fed ended up in troubles with its new objectives in the beginning of 1970’s, when 
the central bank was aiming to reach its maximum employment goal through easy mon-
etary policy. This however caused the money supply to grow faster in contrast with 
general economic growth resulting in accelerated inflation. Simultaneous rise in oil 
prices and increased consumer spending rushed inflation even further. The rapid growth 
of inflation ended up driving the economy into recession and caused unemployment to 
rise significantly. In other words the economy had reached a state of stagflation where 
inflation rises together with economic slowdown. To stop the stagflation spiral the Fed 
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once more ended up raising its Fed Funds Rate aggressively. Even though the recovery 
was not painless, the central bank was successful to restore balance and growth into the 
economy through its conventional monetary tool. (Fed of Philadelphia 2014.) 
Out of its three conventional monetary tools, the Fed ended up using discount lending 
and open market operations during the nations deepest single day stock market crash in 
1987. October 19th, as commonly referred as the Black Monday, the Dow Jones Indus-
trial index dropped suddenly by 23,2 per cent, causing a state of panic in the stock mar-
kets and the credit markets between stock brokerage entities were in danger of freezing 
up completely. (Mishkin & White 2002.) In order to avoid a complete systemic crash in 
the markets and further plummeting of asset classes, the Fed had to step in as a provider 
of liquidity. In the following day of the Black Monday, Alan Greenspan, the current 
chairman of the Fed at that time, informed before market opening that the Fed was will-
ing to offer discount lending for private banks, who would then pass the funding on for 
stock brokers. According to Mishkin (2000) the Fed wanted to send a message for the 
markets that the central bank was willing to offer as much of liquidity as needed for the 
markets to continue operating normally. The Fed’s message was received well by the 
markets, calming the systemic stress down and restoring trust between the credit pro-
viders and stockbrokers. In addition the Fed did security purchases for 17 billion dollars 
to support the banking sector. After the largest shock cleared out, it turned out that mar-
ket entities did not even borrow significant amounts loans through the discount window 
in the following days. The Fed had succeeded to calm the markets down by just an-
nouncing the availability of excess liquidity. (Mishkin 2000; Mishkin & White 2002.) 
In summary the Black Monday proved the open market operations as an effective li-
quidity providing channel, but also showed the power of promises made about the Fed’s 
extensions to its Discount Window –program.  
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4. The Federal Reserve and the financial crisis 
 
The previous chapters have shown how the build up to the financial crisis entailed many 
different pieces and problems within the US economy. Even though the crisis involved 
familiar characteristics as previous economic bubbles in the past, the housing market 
bubble had formed systemic risk factors around it that entailed completely new chal-
lenges for the policy makers to face when the crisis begun. The Federal Reserve’s con-
ventional monetary tools had been sufficient previously to aid the economy in times of 
economical distress, but the financial crisis of 2008 proved to be a challenge for the 
central bank that demanded completely new adjustments to its conduct of monetary 
policy. This chapter goes through the events around the beginning of the crisis and in-
vestigates the Fed’s actions and responses to it.  
 
3.1. The first phase and conventional monetary policy 
 
As the US housing markets started crashing down, marking the beginning for Mishkin’s 
described first phase of the financial crisis, the Fed’s first monetary responses came in 
late 2007 when it started easing its policies to provide more trust and liquidity into the 
markets. When the real estate related securities markets started having significant trou-
bles, the Fed lowered its Fed Funds Rate target by half a per cent to 4,75 per cent, in 
order to ease the pressure for credit markets to freeze up too much. As a support for the 
lower Fed Funds Rate, the Fed made adjustments to the discount-lending program as 
well. In late 2007 the Fed cut its discount-lending rate by half to 5,25 per cent. As an 
extra incentive for the markets, the central bank also widened the range of assets that 
qualified as guarantees for the discount loans. (Mishkin 2010.) 
In 2008 the Fed continued lowering its directing interest rate aggressively, and by April 
the Fed Funds Rate stood already at two per cent (Mishkin 2010). In just over six 
months the Fed Funds Rate had been lowered by over three per cent, which according to 
Bernanke (2009a) can be considered as highly rapid pace in historical perspective. In 
March 2008 the Fed also kept lowering its terms for the Discount Window –program, as 
it lowered the interest on discount loans to only 0,25 per cent higher level than the Fed 
Funds Rate (Mishkin 2010). Bernanke (2009a) states that by lowering the Fed Funds –
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and the discount lending rate, the Fed aimed to cushion the effects from the real estate 
market for the whole economy and help the financial sector. By providing extra liquidi-
ty, the Fed also wanted to calm down concerns about the availability of funding in the 
markets, if the levels of trust and confidence were to drop in the markets. All this was to 
ensure there would not be a sudden selling wave of asset, which would have worsened 
the crisis even further.  
However the Fed had to put in extra effort in order to support the proper functionality of 
its Discount Window –program. This was due to certain aspects of this monetary tool 
during economic slowdowns. As Bernanke (2009a) points out, monetary easing through 
the Discount Window can be problematic, since no entity can be forced to apply for 
new discount loans, no matter how affordable the terms might be. Mishkin (2010) also 
describes how it can be problematic that discount loans are only eligible for traditional 
banks, not for example for investment banks. In addition entities may be afraid of send-
ing a negative message for the markets about their health if they apply for new discount 
loans. In order to ease the issue of banks being afraid of lending out liquidity from the 
central bank and sending out negative signals simultaneously, the Fed founded a pro-
gram called the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The TAF-program was to fulfil the same 
purpose that the traditional discount lending did, but the credit was now offered in silent 
auctions, so that the market entities did not know the counterparts that were in need of 
the extra liquidity. The TAF-program proved to be a successful endeavour and was far 
more popular than the traditional discount lending. Up until March 2008 the Fed was 
able to lend out new loans worth 460 billion dollars. (Cecchetti 2008: 20–21.) In March 
2008 the Fed also widened its liquidity lending by allowing investment banks to partici-
pate in the Discount Window –program as well. Simultaneously the Fed also extended 
the maximum maturity of the loans to 90 days from the traditional 30 days. (Board of 
Governors 2008a.) 
In addition with actions to provide more liquidity for the economy, the Fed had to make 
significant monetary decisions regarding individual struggling financial entities. The 
first entity that faced substantial pressure in the distressed markets to keep functioning 
normally was the investment bank Bear Stearns. As was described in the previous chap-
ter on events surrounding the financial crisis, Bear Stearns was facing serious liquidity 
problems in early 2008. (Mishkin 2010.) The bank was holding a significant amount of 
subprime related mortgage securities, which had been dropping in value during 2007. In 
early 2008 the markets started loosing fate in Bear’s solvency rate, which started creat-
ing a “domino-effect” among different financial institutions in their willingness on 
providing funding for Bear Stearns. When other banks did not provide any more short-
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term funding for Bear, and Bear’s own clients started withdrawing assets from their 
accounts, the bank was forced to inform the Securities and Exchange Commission on 
March 13. 2008 that it would not be able to operate on the following day anymore. 
Bear’s chief executive officer Alan Schwartz tried to keep the bank alive by requesting 
a 30 billion dollar loan from JP Morgan, which had a large ownership in the bank al-
ready, but JP Morgan refused to support Bear Stearns without any aid from the Fed. 
During the following weekend it became clear that Bear Stearns would not be able to do 
business anymore on the following Monday. During the weekend the Fed came to a 
conclusion that Bear Stearns’ bankruptcy would be a too dangerous event on the linked 
financial markets, and decided to broker a deal, where JP Morgan would buy Bear 
Stearns. (FCIR 2011: 286, 288–290.) 
Settlements like this, where the Fed financially aids a private bank buying another entity 
were not completely unprecedented in the central bank’s history. Even though the cen-
tral bank tries to avoid intervening with the markets as much as it can, the JP Morgan 
transaction was not in conflict with the Federal Reserve Act either, because the act al-
lows the Fed to aid or contribute to a sale of a financial institution in extreme condi-
tions, if a buyer cannot be found from the domestic or foreign markets. (FCIR 2011: 
290; Board of Governors 2013.) The Fed defined the price per share for Bear Stearns to 
be two dollars, against the four dollars suggested by JP Morgan, because the Fed want-
ed to send a message, that it was not rewarding Bear Stearns for immoral actions by 
saving it, but to ensure the stability of the financial markets. In order to make the deal 
happen, the Fed did have to take 30 billion dollars worth of risky assets under its own 
balance sheet, out of which JP Morgan only was responsible for 1,1 billion dollars. 
(FCIR 2011: 290.) This part of the deal was among the first examples of the Fed’s new 
monetary policies, which had never been seen before in the central bank’s history 
(Mishkin 2010).  
Even though the Fed had to break its traditional code in its conduct of monetary policy 
with Bear Stearns, Mishkin (2010) states that the Fed did reach its goals with the trans-
action and the markets calmed down in March 2008. For instance the TED-spread, 
which illustrates the level of credit risks in the markets, quickly dropped back to the 
levels where it had been before the problems at Bear Stearns had become known in the 
markets. Just before JP Morgan had bought Bear, the TED-spread had doubled in its 
value. Overall the Fed was able to stabilize the economy during Mishkin’s described 
first phase of the crisis using its conventional monetary policy tools, with the exceptions 
of adjusting its discount lending operations and brokering the deal with Bear Stearns. 
According to Bernanke (2009) the Fed was able to improve the availability of funding 
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and mitigate lack of trust in the markets during 2007. Bernanke also states that the Fed 
was able to lower the unemployment levels that had risen in 2007 and the economy had 
reached a stable state in mid 2008 with inflation starting to accelerate once again. Mish-
kin (2010) describes that economical forecasts in the second quarter of 2008 were show-
ing signs of a moderate growth towards the end of the decade and the prevailing senti-
ment was that the worst slowdown was already passed. At that time arguments were 
even being made for tightening monetary policy, because the nation’s consumer price 
indexes showed pressure for acceleration in the second quarter. Kohn (2008) states that 
the inflation pressures derived mainly from recent hikes in food and oil prices, where 
weak supply levels were raising their prices. 
The Fed’s monetary actions during the first phase of the crisis have also been criticized. 
Especially the aggressiveness of the central bank’s monetary easing in 2007 has raised 
counter arguments. As described by Bernanke (2009), the Fed did make extraordinary 
efforts to lower market interest rates in 2007. Buiter (2013) sees this as questionable. 
Buiter expresses his concerns on Wall Street’s authority over the central bank and sug-
gests that the big financial institutions were successful in scaring the Fed about the pos-
sibility of a stock market crash, were the interest rates not brought down rapidly. Buiter 
therefore sees the aggressive reaction by the Fed to lower the rates too strong. Further-
more Feldstein (2008) shares Buiter’s view of the rate drop being too rushed. He states 
that the interest rate levels were too low in 2007 and 2008 and gave too much room for 
inflation pressures to rise. According to Feldstein (2008) the Fed’s arguments for the 
interest rate cuts were not justified, because when the economic growth slowed down in 
2007, lower interest rates do not fulfil their main purpose of promoting more consump-
tion and higher wages. Instead the rate cuts present themselves straight as rising prices 
in commodities such as oil and food. Feldstein states that when the interest rates are 
low, investors add the portions of commodities in their portfolios to make up for the 
losses in interest rate instruments. Furthermore when the price of crude oil rises, the 
agricultural sector starts emphasizing products that need ethanol in their production 
such as corn, lowering the production and supply of other food, which then raises the 
overall price levels. As mentioned before, Kohn (2008) found evidence for this and em-
phasized that the inflated prices of oil and food were significant concerns in the mid of 
2008.  
Furthermore Armantier (2008) describes how the Fed actually failed with the adjust-
ments to its discount lending operations during 2007. According to Armantier the ad-
justments to the program did not increase the demand for the discount loans nearly 
enough in order to prevent a credit crunch from happening in the markets. This was 
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because the cuts to the interest rate and increases in the maturities of the loans were not 
enough to make the loans seem desirable enough for private institutions. Armantier 
states this was because of two reasons. Firstly the discount lending program was prob-
lematic for private banks during that time, because applying for a loan simultaneously 
sent out a negative signal of the bank’s health for the markets. Secondly the rates for the 
discount loans were too close to the rate levels of the interbank lending, which banks 
traditionally use to finance their day-to-day operations, so lending assets from the inter-
bank markets seemed far more desirable. The problem was that the available liquidity in 
the interbank markets was not sufficient during those days, which caused problems for 
banks in their day-to-day operations.  
The Bear Stearns rescue operation was criticized widely as well in early 2008. The con-
sequences of letting Bear Stearns file for bankruptcy would have been difficult to evalu-
ate before hand, but for a government entity to save a private financial institution al-
ways bears within it risks of aggregating more moral hazard into the system. Roberts 
(2008) discusses the problem of moral hazard with the final selling price of Bear 
Stearns to JP Morgan as well. As mentioned before, the Fed tried to send a warning 
signal for the markets by setting the selling price of Bear only at two dollars per share, 
instead of the suggested four dollars by JP Morgan. In the aftermath of the deal, the 
final price turned out to be five fold at ten dollars a share, which the Fed also went 
along with. Roberts (2008) sees this as a very bad example of the kind of politics a cen-
tral bank can present itself in front of the financial markets.  
 
3.2. The second phase and new unconventional monetary actions 
 
Even though the Federal Reserve had had to make adjustment to its traditional monetary 
policy tools and expand its programs in order to inject liquidity more effectively into the 
markets, these adjustments were only short-term actions and moderate on their scale to 
what the central bank did after the so-called second phase of the financial crisis begun 
when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15th 2008. This chapter goes 
through the fallouts the bankruptcy of the nation’s fourth largest investment caused and 
how the central bank implemented new completely unconventional monetary tools in 
order to address the issues the economy was facing.  
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy the effects transferred directly to other 
financial institutions that had participated in the same mortgage related securities mar-
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kets as Lehman. The systemic market crash hit hardest on the world’s largest insurance 
company AIG. AIG had been heavily active in selling of credit default swaps and a 
large portion of them had underlying assets on Lehman Brothers’ balance sheet. As 
Lehman filed for bankruptcy, all the MBS –and CDO products under Lehman’s balance 
sheet became worthless, which meant that overnight AIG was due to billions of dollars 
of payments for investors who had bought AIG’s credit default swaps. AIG’s liquidity 
simply was not large enough to satisfy this large amount of payment demands. AIG’s 
liquidity troubles became public knowledge quickly and the insurance company’s credit 
ratings were lowered. The lack of trust towards the company meant that other financial 
institutions were not willing to provide any excess liquidity for it. Lending out cash 
through the Fed’s lending programs was not an option either, since even though the cen-
tral bank had earlier expanded its loan availability for investment banks, insurance 
companies were still not eligible for monetary authority’s support. It was clear that AIG 
was not going to be able to do business for long at that point. (Mishkin 2010: 6; The 
FCIR 2011: 346, 349.) 
The troubles with AIG posed another big decision point for the Fed. It had to decide 
whether to stick with the same policy it had chosen with Lehman Brothers, or to come 
to the insurance company’s aid. The New York Fed representative LaTorre described 
the up and downsides for the Federal Reserve in 2008 on the AIG rescue decision. 
LaTorre emphasized that a decision to let AIG file for bankruptcy as well could cause 
serious systemic failures among financial institutions due to liquidity problems and trust 
issues in the US and in Europe as well. AIG’s failure could have also caused significant 
distress in the CDS-markets. On the other hand the decision to aid AIG was highly 
complicated, since it was difficult to evaluate the total amount of monetary help the 
company needed to cover its liquidity demands, because of the complexity of the CDS 
contracts and their linkages. In addition the Fed’s decision to help out another financial 
institution just after letting one fail the day before was conflicting and prone to cause 
more possible incentives for unmoral behaviour in the financial sector.  After considera-
tion on the 16th of September 2008 the Fed decided to rely on the clause in the Federal 
Reserve Act allowing it to aid financial institutions again, and granted an 85 billion dol-
lar loan for AIG for it to survive its on going liquidity issues. The Fed justified it’s the 
decision on the concerns of the risks for the already unstable financial system, pressure 
for lending costs to rise and for a threat for weakening position for households. (FCIR 
2011: 348, 350.)  
Bailing AIG out did not however stop the advancing of the crisis in the financial mar-
kets. Mishkin (2010) brings out the next problem causing more liquidity problems in the 
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market, which was the crash of the Reserve Primary Fund. The Reserve Primary Fund is 
a very large mutual fund in the US that financial institutions invest in. The philosophy 
of the fund relies heavily on very safe and steady investment instruments, such as top 
rated short-term government and corporate bonds. Therefore the fund is threated as a 
substitute for a bank account with a slightly higher yield expectation. (Bernanke 2012.) 
In 2008 the fund held a large portion of Lehman’s bonds, meaning that the investment 
bank’s failure affected the fund’s liquidity significantly as well. This caused concerns 
towards the funds ability to function appropriately, which triggered a withdrawal wave 
of assets from the fund. The fund quickly lost 90 per cent of its assets due to withdraw-
als. During September and October in 2008 banks took out their investments from other 
mutual funds as well trying to hedge their position in the markets, but Mishkin (2010) 
emphasizes that this actually ended up worsening the banks’ situation. This was because 
the notable investments banks normally have on the mutual fund accounts generate an 
important source of cash flow for the banks deriving from interest rate yields from the 
funds. These yields act as insurance for daily liquidity for the banks. Now when the 
banks withdraw their investments from the funds, they did not have that incoming cash 
flow for the months to come anymore. The Fed reacted aggressively to this problem in 
co-operation with the US treasury, and offered to provide excess loans for institutions 
that would keep investing their cash back to the mutual funds. In addition the treasury 
promised to guarantee all the new deposits being made into the mutual funds. (Bernanke 
2012.)  
In spite of the Fed’s lending operations, the aid for AIG and the support for the mutual 
funds, governing authorities were still unable to avoid the credit markets from freezing 
up. According to Bernanke (2009) the credit crunch of the financial markets drove the 
US economy into a recession in late 2008. The crisis in the credit markets caused asset 
classes’ values to crash and banks stopped lending for households and corporations. The 
weak state of the economy showed in weak consumption and investing of households 
and companies, rise in unemployment numbers and diminishing domestic production.  
To ease the situation in the credit markets the Fed initiated new lending programs to 
provide additional liquidity. These new programs included the “Term Asset-Backed-
Security Lending Facility” (TALF) and “Commercial Paper Funding Facility” (CPFF). 
The TALF-program was targeted to aid households and small-sized businesses, with the 
Fed granting loans against high rated asset-backed-securities. The CPFF-program was 
established to support businesses directly. Within the program the Fed bought asset-
backed-securities straight from financially healthy companies to support their liquidity. 
 37 
In addition the Fed expanded it lending activities within the TAF-program. (Bernanke 
2009b.)    
As the recession kept worsening the Fed published a statement on the 25th of November 
in 2008 informing that the central bank would start an asset purchase program, which 
would be targeting mortgage-backed-securities directly. In the statement the Fed in-
formed it would be performing asset purchases for 1,25 trillion dollars buying Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac MBSs. (Board of Governors 2008b.) The asset purchase program 
the Fed announced that day, diverged significantly from the conventional open market 
operations the central bank performed, which traditionally are targeted to short-term 
treasury bonds. Mishkin (2010) calls this type of asset purchasing activity with the 
widely used term quantitative easing (QE). In general, the term quantitative easing is 
used, when a central bank performs bond and security purchases, which expand the cen-
tral bank’s balance sheet and increase the supply of money within the economy.  
In theoretical terms a central bank uses QE in attempt to affect the interest rate structure 
of the asset classes it is buying, which usually fore most are treasury bonds (Yu 2016). 
The interest rate structure is traditionally referred as the term structure of interest rates 
(TSIR). The TSIR tells how investors expect the future levels of interest rates to devel-
op. The TSIR can be illustrated by using a yield curve describing the yields of the same 
asset with different maturities at a particular point of time. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 
2011: 53.) Yu (2016) describes how the yield curve normally has a tendency to be up-
ward sloping especially during times when the economy is on a steady growth path.  
Figure 4. The Yield curve on US treasuries on 1st of March 2005 with 1 month to 20 
years maturities.  
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Figure four illustrates the structure of US treasuries yield curve on the 1st of March 
2005. From the figure four it can be seen that the longer the maturity gets on the US 
treasury bonds the higher the yield rises on them. This particular yield curve illustrates 
the situation, which Yu (2016) describes as the traditional shape of the curve. The shape 
of the curve is upward sloping because the longer the maturities grow on the bonds, the 
more uncertain investors become of the interest rate environments around the future 
maturity date and therefore demand a higher interest on the bonds.  
Quantitative easing programs are conducted in attempt to alter this yield curve in the 
direction the central bank wants in order to adjust the credit markets towards the envi-
ronment that is favourable for the central bank’s on going state of monetary policy 
strategy. In times of economical distress the yield curve can be upwardly steep in the 
eyes of the central bank, because investors are uncertain about the future and loosing 
trust among each other, which causes investors to demand higher interest rates on the 
bonds, causing the yield curve to rise. With QE it is possible for the central bank to af-
fect the yield levels by starting to purchase notable amounts of the bonds that contain 
too high yield levels at that time. (Chen, Curdia & Ferrero 2012.) When the central bank 
starts buying the specific bonds, their demand rises on the markets and their supply de-
creases, causing their price levels to increase. When the bonds become more valuable 
due to the rising price levels, investors do not demand as high yields from them any-
more, causing the yield curve to flatten. If the central bank succeeds in flattening the 
yield curve, it should enable market interest rates to decrease all together, which makes 
credit more affordable for consumers and businesses and should give room for inflation 
to accelerate. (Yu 2016.)  
Specific about the Fed’s QE-program was that the purchases were targeted to MBSs. 
Bernanke (2012b) states that the Fed’s goal was to support the MBS markets, which had 
been struggling heavily after the Lehman bankruptcy. The Fed’s goal was to decrease 
the supply of MBS-products in the markets, which should cause their values to increase 
and lower the yield demands for them. The logic with the MBSs follows the same path 
as was described earlier by Yu regarding treasury bonds. If the Fed were to be able to 
increase the MBSs price levels, financial institutions would be able to use the securities 
better as collateral for credit transactions or liquidate them easier, which would all to-
gether ease the credit crunch in the markets. In addition the MBS purchases were made 
to support the housing markets in hopes that they would lower interest rate levels for 
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new mortgages and increase demand for new homes. This would give support for new 
home construction incentives as well. (Bernanke 2012b; The New York Fed 2010.) 
As the Fed was initiating its first large scale asset purchases, the central bank was also 
making significant adjustments to the Federal Funds Rate. The Fed had been decreasing 
the main directing interest rate aggressively already in early 2008 as can be seen in fig-
ure five, but in December 2008 the Fed did something unprecedented and lowered the 
target level for the rate to be between zero and 25 basis points (0,25 per cent). Notable 
in the announcement of the new extremely low target range was that the Fed informed 
the public that the rate cut would be permanent for an undefined period of time and 
rates would not be lifted before the central bank could see clear improvements in eco-
nomic activity and growth.  (Board of Governors 2008c; Mishkin 2010.) 
 Figure 5. The Fed Funds Rate from January 2007 to December 2008 
Mishkin (2010) and Yu (2016) emphasize that the promise by the Fed to keep the rates 
at zero bound level was an important monetary action that was made also to support the 
QE-program and to control the expectations of the markets for the future. Firstly ac-
cording to Mishkin, the promise of the low rates for a long period of time increases con-
fidence and trust in the markets, since investors can be more certain about the economi-
cal environment in the near future and financial institutions can forecast their interest 
rate exposures better. Secondly Yu (2016) points out that the commitment to the zero 
bound interest rate policy supports the QE program significantly as well. This is be-
cause it can build trust within the markets for the Fed’s commitment to the QE program. 
If the markets fear that the Fed would have to raise interest rates if inflation would ac-
celerate above the two per cent target, investors could not find the low levels of interest 
rates trustworthy in a longer time frame and the yield curve would not necessarily flat-
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ten. Another concern could be that if the Fed would not stick with the zero bound inter-
est rate level, the central bank would start losing significant amounts of money with the 
MBSs it buys. This is because when interest rates rise, they result in falling asset prices. 
This would also concern the MBSs under the Fed’s balance sheet and in order to mini-
mize its losses, the Fed might have to sell the MBSs back to the markets, which would 
reverse the monetary easing effect that was desirable when the securities were bought in 
the first place. So by committing to the low interest rate policy, the Fed would be able 
to strengthen the credibility of the QE program as well. (Yu 2016.) 
By the end of 2010 the US economy kept still suffering of low growth and pressures for 
disinflation kept rising. In a statement released by the Federal Open Market Committee 
in November 2010 the committee described that household spending was still suffering 
due to high unemployment levels, low housing wealth and tight credit environment. 
Corporate investments had also started to decrease further and payroll additions were 
diminishing. The construction market on new homes continued to be depressed as well. 
These developments within the economy meant that the central bank was falling signifi-
cantly behind from its duel mandate of sustaining a two per cent inflation level and 
maximum employment. Hence worth the Fed announced on November third 2010 that 
it would be extending its asset purchasing program it had started in 2008. The program 
would include new purchases of assets for 600 billion dollars by the end of the second 
quarter of 2011. (Board of Governors 2010.) The new quantitative easing program 
(QE2) differed from the QE1-program in the assets it was targeted to, since in 2010 the 
Fed started to focus the purchases into long-term US treasury bonds instead of the 
MBSs that the QE1 was associated with (Hennessy 2011). According to Bullard (2010) 
the Fed wanted to target longer-term treasury bonds specifically because the yield levels 
on them were still too high in the eyes of the central bank. Targeting the purchases on 
them could lower their yields down and help financial entities use them better as guar-
antees if their values would rise. The purchases would also inject more capital into the 
financial markets to support the credit environment. Along with the initiation of the 
QE2-program the Fed continued to inform that the Fed Funds Rate would still be kept at 
zero bound levels for an extended period of time in order to support the QE-program 
and the struggling economy (Board of Governors 2010).  
During the end of 2011 and 2014 the Fed continued on its easy monetary policy path. 
This included additional asset purchases and continual commitment to the zero bound 
levels of the main directing interest rate. Firstly in late 2011 the Fed altered its asset 
purchasing programs by introducing a program where it intended to extend the bonds’ 
maturities it was holding under its balance sheet (Board of Governors 2011). This pro-
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gram has also been known as “Operation Twist”, where the Fed simultaneously sells 
shorter-term treasury bonds and buys longer-term bonds. This should theoretically flat-
ten the yield curve on the bonds as bond yields should rise on the short-term bonds and 
fall on the long-term bonds. This happens because as the Fed starts selling shorter-term 
bonds, their supply on the market increases and their price levels falls down, causing 
investors to demand higher yields from them. If the Fed is then simultaneously buying 
long-term bonds their prices should rise due to their increased demand, causing their 
yields to drop. This yield curve alteration could then make long term credit more af-
fordable for businesses for instance and promote economic growth. (Joyce, Miles, Scott 
& Vayanos 2012.) Along with the Operation Twist, the Fed also began buying MBS-
securities again in late 2012 by 40 billion dollars per month to support the housing mar-
kets. Figure five illustrates the Fed’s asset purchases from 2008 till 2016 and the devel-
opment of the Fed Funds Rate. As it can be seen from the figure five, the purchases of 
treasury bonds and MBSs have extended the central banks balance sheet significantly 
and the programs have lasted over five years. In addition it can be seen that the assets 
that have been purchased have not been sold yet back to the markets by the end of 2016 
and hence worth the monetary stimulus effect is still in place and has not been reversed 
yet. Also the Fed Funds Rate still remains on a significantly low level.  
Figure 6. Amounts of MBS-securities and US treasuries on the Fed’s balance sheet 
(left) and the effective Fed Funds Rate’s development (right), (left: millions of dollars, 
right: per cent) 
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5. Empirical analysis 
 
The empirical section of this paper is dedicated for examining the effects on the US 
economy that have followed from the unconventional monetary policy action taken by 
the Federal Reserve after the financial crisis of 2008. The examination is focused on 
two separate monetary actions and their different aspects, quantitative easing and zero 
bound interest rate policy. These two monetary tools were chosen because they are di-
rect and significant expansions to the central bank’s traditional tools and the departure 
from the conventional policies concerning these two tools has been substantial. The 
study on these tools is also valuable because other central banks around the world have 
conducted similar departures from their conventional policy regimes during this paper’s 
research period, so the results of this paper can also be used as a comparative view for 
other nations’ modern monetary policy conduct. Before moving to the empirical study 
and its results, the data used for the research and the study’s methodology will be de-
scribed.  
 
4.1. Quantitative easing data 
 
For studying the effects of quantitative easing as an explaining factor on economical 
developments, different portions of the asset purchases are being examined as well as 
all of the asset purchases as a whole. As mentioned by Blinder (2010), the Fed’s asset 
purchases expand the monetary base of the whole economy. During the asset purchase 
program era, the monetary base of the US economy has indeed been increasing signifi-
cantly and hence worth monetary base data from January 2009 till July 2016 is being 
used to examine the QE-programs as a whole. For examining the different asset pur-
chases separately, the empirical research contains data of the development of the Fed’s 
balance sheet. As mentioned before the asset purchases have included mortgage-
backed-securities and different maturity US treasury bonds. Therefore data of the 
amounts of these securities are being used as well between 2009 and 2016. All QE data 
is derived from the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s database and the figures are in a month-
ly form. 
Along with announcements of the asset purchase programs, the Fed has been consistent-
ly reporting certain targets factors it has wanted to affect with the QE-programs. The 
factors that are included for this research have all been specifically named in the first 
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announcements of the separate asset purchase programs as main targets for the pro-
grams. These targets are inflation rate, MBS –and US treasury yields, household con-
sumption, credit markets, mortgage lending and housing markets. All data is between 
2009 and 2016 as monthly values and is collected from the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
database.  
 
4.2. Zero bound Federal Funds Rate data 
 
To examine the developments of the Fed Funds Rate and its effects on the economy, 
data of the effective monthly Fed Funds Rate is being used from sample between 2009 
and 2016. The effective rate is being used so that the real fluctuations in the rate win-
dow can be included into the used empirical models. As described before the extended 
zero bound interest rate policy was implemented to support the QE-programs, but it also 
was practised to support the credit markets by lowering market interest rates. The Fed 
also hoped for it to support higher inflation and the housing markets. Therefore data of 
US inflation, amount of credit and levels of mortgage rates is being used in the empiri-
cal study. The possible effects of the Fed Funds Rate adjustments to the MBS and treas-
ury yields data is also studied to see if there are any explanatory findings to be seen in 
contrast with the results of the QE data. All of the data being used in this study is de-
scribed in appendix two and the time series figures of the data in appendix one.  
 
4.3. Study methods 
 
The effects of the quantitative easing programs and the zero bound interest rate policy 
on the US economy is studied by using ordinary least squares linear regression analysis 
and vector autoregressive models. Regression analysis should fit the purpose of the 
study well, because it allows examining two or more factors’ influence on one another. 
In the different regression models the economical factors that were listed before, as the 
Fed’s objectives to influence, will be the so-called factors to be explained or the de-
pendent factors in the regression models. The explaining factors or the independent fac-
tors will be the different parts of quantitative easing and the zero bound interest rate 
data. The objective of the regression models is to see, how highly significant are the 
explanatory degrees of QE and the Fed Funds Rate –factors against the real economical 
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factors. The separate regression models are described in regression equations 2–12. In 
most cases, to achieve reliable results, lags are taken from the explaining factors, be-
cause monetary policy actions tend to take time to have an effect on the economy. The 
number of the lags is adjusted separately for each regression in order to achieve the 
most reliable results. In order to avoid issues with heteroskedasticity, robust standard 
errors are used in all of the regression models. In addition since the samples are not like-
ly to be constant in time, logarithmic and first difference –transformations are made for 
the estimators to avoid non-stationary time series issues. Furthermore let it be men-
tioned that since QE also has an effect on the Federal Funds Rate as was discussed in 
the chapter on the Fed’s monetary tools, QE and Fed Funds Rate will never be included 
in same regression models to avoid issues with multi-collinearity. Tables 1–11 display 
the most significant factors by their statistical t-values of the separate models. The sta-
tistical significance of a factor is marked with an asterisk (*). Ten per cent significance 
level is marked with one asterisk (*), five per cent with two asterisks (**) and one per 
cent with three asterisks (***). Tables 1–11 also show the values for the long-run pro-
pensity (LRP) -coefficients for each regression model. The LRP coefficients can give 
further indications of the monetary policy actions’ effects on the economical factors on 
the longer run past the observation range. The examination of the LRP-coefficient is 
suitable in this case because monetary policy actions tend to have lagged effects on the 
economy.  In order to derive the value for the LRP-coefficient, one lagged estimator 
needs to be taken from the dependent variable. But since the lagged value for the de-
pendent variables coefficient may cause delusions for the regressions, these separate 
regressions are not taken into account or illustrated any other way than for the coeffi-
cient values that are needed for calculating the LRP-coefficient. The values for the 
LRP-coefficients are calculated using the equation 1, where the 𝛽! -factors are the esti-
mators for the explaining factors and 𝛽! -factors are lagged estimators of the factors to 
be explained.  
(1)              𝐿𝑅𝑃 = !!!!!! 
In support of the regression models, vector autoregressive (VAR) -models are also used. 
In this study the VAR-models are used study the relationship of one monetary policy 
action and one economical figure. The VAR-model shows how an unexpected shock in 
the monetary policy variable would affect the economical variable. (Suomen Pankki 
1989: 13–15.) 
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4.4. Regression results 
 
The first regression models study the effects of the quantitative easing programs as a 
whole. Therefore the explaining factor in the models is the monetary base, which takes 
into account every different asset purchase program.  
(2) d lnCPI =α +β1
t=1
9
∑ d lnMonetarybaset−1 +β2d lnMonetarybase14 +ε
 
Table 1. Coefficients for regression 2. 
Variable        Coefficient      std. error         t-value   p-value            
const                        0,00110706    0,000336786     3,287     0,0018      *** 
ld_Monbase_2         0,0468472      0,0108494         4,318    6,63e-05    *** 
ld_Monbase_4       −0,0138489      0,00812159     −1,705    0,0938          * 
ld_Monbase_5       −0,0339827      0,0149396       −2,275    0,0268        ** 
ld_Monbase_7         0,0223626      0,00768056       2,912    0,0052       *** 
ld_Monbase_14     −0,0137331      0,00535580     −2,564    0,0131        ** 
R-squared:             0,379608    Adjusted R-squared:   0,255530             LRP: -0,0027 
 
(3) d lncredit =α +β1d lnmonetarybase+β2 d lnmonetarybaset−1 +ε
t=6
14
∑
 
Table 2. Coefficients for regression 3. 
Variable     Coefficient      std. error        t-value     p-value              
const                 0,00479585   0,000709276    6,762       3,80e-09 *** 
ld_Monbase         −0,0782250    0,0318817      −2,454       0,0167   ** 
ld_Monbase_10   −0,0719817    0,0355723      −2,024       0,0470   ** 
ld_Monbase_14   −0,0606321    0,0249751      −2,428       0,0178   ** 
R-squared              0,458785   Adjusted R-squared   0,379195          LRP: -0,0815 
 
(4) d lnconsumption =α +β1d lnmonetarybase+ε  
Table 3. Coefficients for regression 4. 
Variable    Coefficient    std. error            t-value     p-value             
const                     0,00317745   0,000325366     9,766       7,88e-16 *** 
ld_Monbase        −0,0397343     0,0177042       −2,244       0,0272   ** 
R-squared:            0,176765       Adjusted R-squared:   0,167718               LRP: -0,021  
 
Regressions two, three and four study the relationship between quantitative easing and 
three separate economical factors that the Fed has mentioned as its targets to influence 
through out all of the asset purchasing programs. The Fed has hoped that QE would 
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promote higher inflation, which would suggest a positive relationship between mone-
tary base and inflation, represented here by the consumer price index (CPI). The results 
of the regression model two do not however signal an expected relationship between 
these factors during 2009 and 2016. The coefficients showing any significant explanato-
ry levels in table one have low values and are not consistent in terms of their positive or 
negative signs. For instance even though the two month lagged coefficient is positive as 
the central bank would hope, the fourth and fifth month’s coefficients are negative and 
reverse the positive effect the expansion in the monetary base has done for inflation 
earlier. The LRP-coefficient also shows that the changes in the monetary base would 
actually have a small but negative effect in contrast with inflation on the long run. The 
R-squared and the adjusted R-squared –coefficients, which indicate the fraction of the 
variations in inflation that is explained by the model, confirm however that the size of 
the monetary base has explained a significant portion of the variance in inflation during 
the sample period.  
Regressions three and four indicate same types of results in terms of the signs of the 
coefficients as the inflation model did. The Fed informed constantly that they hoped QE 
to be a promoter for higher consumption and lending activity in the country. Equation 
three compares the development of bank lending and the monetary base and only ends 
up signalling a negative 0,07 per cent relationship with the two factors during 2009 and 
2016 as described in table two. Only two lagged coefficients show statistically signifi-
cant values and their signs are negative as well. The R-squared values are relatively 
high which does indicate that monetary base has a significant role in bank lending. It 
seems however that even though the Fed’s asset purchases have freed up new capital for 
the banks to lend out for consumers and businesses, the excess reserves have not trans-
ferred into new loans on a significant level.  
Equation four’s results follow the pattern of models two and three as could be expected 
since higher inflation would also need higher levels of credit and consumption. The 
model four suggests that there has been a negative relationship between consumption 
and monetary base developments during the sample period and the coefficient only sug-
gests a negative 0,04 per cent relationship between the two factors. The R-squared val-
ues in table three suggest that there is still some value for monetary base as an explain-
ing force behind consumption.   
Equations five, six and seven study the effects of monetary base developments on an-
other important target of the Fed’s monetary policy between 2009 and 2016, the hous-
ing markets. The developments in the real estate sector are investigated through changes 
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in average mortgage rates, housing prices and sales of new homes, since these are fac-
tors that the central bank has informed as targets that the QE-policy should affect.  
(5) dmortgagerate =α +β1 d lnMonetarybaset−1
t=1
4
∑ +ε  
Table 4. Coefficients for regression 5. 
Variable    Coefficient    std. error        t-value   p-value            
 const           −0,0267555    0,0161849    −1,653     0,1021  
 ld_Monbase       −0,438744      0,709018      −0,6188   0,5377  
 ld_Monbase_1     0,528502      0,626545        0,8435    0,4014  
 ld_Monbase_2     1,41943        0,447191        3,174      0,0021  *** 
 ld_Monbase_3     0,117551      0,701780        0,1675    0,8674  
 ld_Monbase_4   −0,524482      0,475145      −1,104      0,2729  
 R-squared            0,134730      Adjusted R-squared   0,082605     LRP: 1,044 
 
(6) d lnHousepriceindex =α +β1
t=1
18
∑ d lnMonetarybaset−1 +ε  
Table 5. Coefficients for regression 6. 
Variable    Coefficient    std. error            t-value    p-value            
const                     0,00328184   0,00211896       1,549      0,1275  
ld_Monbase_1      0,0509134       0,0274945       1,852      0,0697  * 
ld_Monbase_2      0,0761949       0,0241588       3,154      0,0027  *** 
ld_Monbase_3      0,0802224       0,0349719       2,294      0,0259  ** 
ld_Monbase_6    −0,0616636       0,0295764    −2,085       0,0420  ** 
ld_Monbase_7    −0,0751237       0,0307177    −2,446       0,0179  ** 
R-squared:             0,375014        Adjusted R-squared:   0,146654                             LRP: -0,083 
 
 (7) d lnNewhomesales =α +β1
t=1
15
∑ d lnMonetarybaset−1 +ε  
Table 6. Coefficients for regression 7. 
Variable    Coefficient    std. error         t-value     p-value            
const                     0,0131541     0,00760620    1,729      0,0888  * 
ld_Monbase        −0,556025       0,429163      −1,296      0,2000  
ld_Monbase_1      1,09079         0,415279        2,627      0,0109  ** 
ld_Monbase_3    −1,31385         0,528835      −2,484      0,0157  ** 
ld_Monbase_8    −0,682983       0,270257      −2,527      0,0141  ** 
ld_Monbase_14  −0,775680       0,354893      −2,186      0,0327  ** 
R-squared:            0,404897       Adjusted R-squared:   0,248804                               LRP: -0,601 
 
Table four shows that the size of the nation’s monetary base has had quite a low explan-
atory force over the development of the interest rates on mortgage lending. As the mon-
etary base expands, banks should have more assets available for lending and the supply 
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of mortgage loans should increase, causing the mortgage rates to fall. This cannot be 
seen in the signs or significance of the coefficients in table four as only one coefficient 
shows statistically significant results implicating a positive relationship between an in-
crease in monetary base and the development in mortgage rates. Both the one signifi-
cant coefficient of two-month lag and the LRP-coefficient suggest that during the sam-
ple period a one per cent rise in monetary base has increased mortgage rates by over one 
unit.  
Equation six studies how much the monetary base has promoted growth in the nation’s 
house prices. The monetary base has had an effect as an explaining factor to the housing 
price developments according to the R-squared coefficients as described in table five. 
The results still show a weak correlation however judging by the coefficient values. 
With one month to three months lags, the coefficients show expected positive values as 
the Fed hoped for the QE-programs to promote stronger real estate markets. The next 
significant values are found for the six and seven-month lags, which have negative signs 
indicating a reversing effect for the positive price development in the earlier months. 
The LRP-coefficient has a negative value and actually indicates that the expansion in 
the monetary base has a negative 0,6 per cent effect over the long run for the housing 
prices.  
The Fed has also informed that the QE-programs were initiated to promote stronger 
environment for new home sales. The outcomes of equation seven in table six do not 
give strong results for the QE-program since all except one of the coefficients show 
negative correlation between QE and new home sales and the LRP-coefficient also has a 
negative sign. In addition whereas the coefficients housing prices were relatively low, 
the values for new home sales coefficients are many times higher. For instance the 
overall coefficient for the equation suggests that a one per cent rise in the monetary base 
results in a 0,56 per fall in new home sales.  
As discussed earlier on the initiations of the QE-programs and quantitative easing’s 
general theory, one of the Fed’s main goals was to affect the interest rate levels on US 
treasuries and MBS-securities. Equations eight through ten study the QE programs more 
closely, and separate the treasury and MBS asset purchases. The variables chosen to be 
studied are the yield to maturities (YTMs) of the different asset classes because these 
rates incorporate market expectations of these rates daily and determine their market 
price levels. Therefore they should represent the response to the asset purchases well.  
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(8) dMBS30YearYTM =α +β1 d lnMBSheldbyFedt−1
t=1
15
∑ +ε  
Table 7. Coefficients for regression 8. 
Variable                Coefficient    std. error        t-value  p-value              
const                               −0,0436778   0,0182261    −2,396    0,0196  ** 
ld_MBSheldbyFed_2     −7,96525       2,03567        −3,913    0,0002  *** 
ld_MBSheldbyFed_3       11,2811       2,99670           3,765    0,0004  *** 
ld_MBSheldbyFed_4     −14,6541       4,35313        −3,366    0,0013  *** 
ld_MBSheldbyFed_5        9,90598      3,79700           2,609    0,0114  ** 
ld_MBSheldbyFed_7        8,76339      3,55158           2,467    0,0164  ** 
ld_MBSheldbyFed_8      −6,15682      3,68600         −1,670    0,1000  * 
ld_MBSheldbyFed10      −5,18312      2,84076         −1,825    0,0730  * 
ld_MBSheldbyFed15      −1,37258      0,576637       −2,380    0,0204  ** 
R-squared :           0,391      Adjusted R-squared:   0,231                              LRP: 3,10 
 
The equation eight concerns the MBS purchases directly in contrast to the development 
of 30-year MBS market yields to maturity. The maturity of 30-year securities was cho-
sen since longer maturity securities tend to respond more strongly into chances in inter-
est rate environments.  The Fed informed that it was doing the asset purchases in order 
to increase the assets’ values and therefore lower their yields. This would suggest the 
coefficients to have negative signs. This does not hold constantly however according to 
the results in table seven. The first lags of the independent variable, which represents 
the amount of MBS-securities under the Fed’s balance sheet, show that the effects shift 
from negative to positive from two till five months time. It seems that the MBS-
purchases have a more consistent negative affect on their yields on a longer time period, 
since the eight, ten and 15 month lags show negative signs with statistically significant 
results. The LRP-coefficient also has a positive sign suggesting a 0,03 unit change in 
the MBS yields if the amount of MBSs rises by one per cent in the Fed’s balance sheet. 
The R-squared values show nevertheless that the MBS purchases have played a signifi-
cant role in the development of the MBS market yields.  
Equation nine studies the effects of the US treasury purchases. The R-squared values for 
equation nine in table eight show that the US treasury purchases have had a significance 
effect on explaining the development of the US treasury yields. The equation also 
shows more statistically significant coefficients than equation eight did, but seems to 
have same kind of inconsistencies with the signs of the coefficients. The initial effect of 
the purchases for the first months show a negative effect on the yields as the Fed would 
hope but the effect seems to be inconsistent when the lags move further back in time. 
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The coefficients also have relatively low values, suggesting under 0,1 unit change for 
the US treasury yields. The LRP-coefficient has an expected negative sign from the 
Fed’s perspective, but a low value as well.  
(9) dTreasury10YearYTM =α +β1d ln TreasuriesheldbyFedt−1
t=1
11
∑ +β2d ln TreasuriesheldbyFedt−1
t=15
18
∑
+ε
 
Table 8. Coefficients for regression 9. 
Variable        Coefficient    std. error       t-value     p-value           
 
const                        0,000428181  0,0332919    0,01286   0,9898   
ld_Alltreasurie         7,46574         1,16456         6,411      3,47e-08 *** 
ld_Alltreasurie_1   −3,03365         1,46027       −2,077      0,0424   ** 
ld_Alltreasurie_3   −5,39087         0,904459     −5,960      1,86e-07 *** 
ld_Alltreasurie_4     4,57281         2,01313          2,271      0,0271   **  
ld_Alltreasurie_5   −1,99319         1,16279        −1,714     0,0921   * 
ld_Alltreasurie_8   −6,90922         1,91201        −3,614     0,0007   *** 
ld_Alltreasur~_10    5,66163         1,34161          4,220     9,21e-05 *** 
ld_Alltreasur~_11  −3,57025         0,924263      −3,863     0,0003   *** 
ld_Alltreasur~_15    4,42662         0,976336        4,534     3,17e-05 *** 
ld_Alltreasur~_16  −7,47446         1,29462        −5,773     3,73e-07 *** 
ld_Alltreasur~_17    1,98221         0,886578         2,236     0,0294   ** 
R-squared:                0,531762      Adjusted R-squared:   0,395547             LRP: -0,669 
 
As mentioned before the Fed also incorporated the zero bound interest rate policy to go 
alongside with the QE-programs during the sample period of 2009 till 2016. The Fed 
wanted to promote more economic growth with the low interest rate policy through 
lower market interest rates, which could set the environment more favourable for bor-
rowing, consumption and inflation. As mentioned earlier, the commitment to the zero 
bound policy can also be a significant factor in the success of quantitative easing. This 
is why it is also suitable to study the Fed Funds Rate’s affects on the economy.  
 
 
Table 9. Coefficients for regression 10. 
Variable   Coefficient     std. error          t-value    p-value            
const                  −0,00517033   0,0262504     −0,1970     0,8444  
 d_FFRate_2      −3,51319         1,20181         −2,923       0,0046  *** 
 d_FFRate_10      4,20591         1,81567           2,316       0,0233  ** 
 R-squared:           0,198937   Adjusted R-squared:             0,133096      LRP: 0,670 
(10) dMBS30yearYTM =α +β1 dFFR t−1+β2dFFR10 +ε
t=1
4
∑
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(11) dtreasury10yearYTM =α +β1 dFFRt−1 +ε
t=7
12
∑  
Table 10. Coefficients for regression 11. 
Variable          Coefficient   std. error         t-value   p-value            
const             −0,0168392    0,0231446    −0,7276   0,4693  
 d_FFR         −1,53711        0,842901       −1,824    0,0725  * 
 d_FFR_6     −1,55855        0,683701       −2,280    0,0257  ** 
 d_FFR_7       1,11901        0,635748         1,760    0,0828  * 
 d_FFR_8       2,18854        1,06245           2,060    0,0432  ** 
 d_FFR_9       2,42866        0,893228         2,719    0,0083  *** 
 R-squared:      0,176563      Adjusted R-squared:   0,081092       LRP: 1,708 
 
Equations ten and eleven are conducted to see how significant factor has the Fed Funds 
Rate been as an explaining force behind the developments of the MBS -and US treasury 
yields. The R-squared coefficients in tables ten and eleven are lower for both equations 
than they generally were with the equations that incorporated QE as an explaining fac-
tor. Therefore the Fed Funds Rate has not been as significant factor in the developments 
of these particular asset classes as the asset purchases after the financial crisis. Equation 
ten only gathers two statistically significant coefficients, two month and ten-month lags. 
In order for the Fed’s monetary policy easing to work effectively the signs of the varia-
bles should be the same, in other words if the Fed Funds Rate decreases, so should the 
asset yields too. The MBS equation ten does not give consistent proof of this according 
to the significant factors in table nine. The LRP-coefficient on the other hand does sug-
gest that there is a positive correlation between the rates on the long run of 0,67 units. 
Equation 11 suggests that the Fed Funds Rate has had a more consistent affect on the 
longer run on the US treasury yields. Lags of seven, eight and nine months in table 11 
all have positive signs and their coefficients are quite high. The LRP-value is also much 
higher than it is with the MBS-securities.  
(12) d lnCPI =α +β1 dFFRt−1 +ε
t!1
6
∑  
Table 11. Coefficients for regression 12. 
Variable          Coefficient     std. error     t-value     p-value            
const                           0,00140380   0,000254483    5,516       4,24e-07 *** 
d_FFR                      −0,00723994   0,00808446    −0,8955     0,3732   
d_FFR_1                  −0,0264858     0,0121542      −2,179       0,0323   ** 
d_FFR_6                  −0,00656549   0,00263157    −2,495        0,0147   ** 
R-squared:                  0,184887      Adjusted R-squared:   0,112662       LRP: -0,022 
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Finally equation 12 looks into the relationship between inflation (CPI) and the Fed 
Funds Rate. In order for the Fed’s monetary policy to work accordingly, the FFR coef-
ficients should have negative signs, since inflation tends to move in the opposite direc-
tion than interest rates. This is also true according to equation 12 during the sample pe-
riod and the significant coefficients in table 11 including the LRP are negative. It seems 
that the first reaction to changes in the Fed Funds Rate is the most significant as the one 
month lagged coefficient has the highest value, meaning a one unit change in the FFR, 
results in a -2,65 unit change in inflation. The R-squared values remain relatively low in 
contrast with the values that the QE equations receive, and it is therefore probable that 
many other aspects within the economy affect inflation as well.  
 
4.5. VAR-model results 
 
The VAR-models are conducted in support of the regression analysis. The separate 
VAR-models’ impulse responses are described in figure seven and each of the figures 
are derived from the same data samples that were used in the corresponding regression 
models. The numbers of the impulse responses correspond with the number of the re-
gression equation they are derived from. The VAR-models are used to illustrate what 
would happen to the dependent variable in the regression models, if an unexpected 
shock of one standard error were to occur in the independent variable. This concerns the 
time line where the sample data was taken from but the VAR-model also indicates the 
variables relationship for the future. This can be valuable for the examination of the 
Fed’s monetary policy after the financial crisis, because as can be seen from figure five, 
the low interest rate policy and the QE asset purchases are still in affect in the Fed’s 
monetary policy. All the VAR-figures are illustrating a time span of 24 months. 
The clearest initial reactions according to the VAR-models are resulted for inflation, 
mortgage rates and consumption. The initial positive shock in monetary base results in a 
clear spike in inflation according to the first VAR-model. The effect seems to be very 
minor nevertheless; only little above 0,001 per cent affect, and the initial response fades 
out during the first 12 months and starts to flatten when the timeline moves further. The 
first reaction in mortgage rates to a shock in monetary base turns out to be exactly op-
posite to what the Fed would hope, as the first response results in a minor increase in 
mortgage rates. It takes up to around six months for the first shock to clear out before 
the response switches to negative territory. All together a shock in monetary base does 
not create a significant response in the mortgage rates judging by the coefficients’ val-
 53 
ues. On the other hand a shock in the monetary base seems to have a more desirable 
effect for consumption from the central bank’s perspective. The first 12-month period 
includes two clear positive spikes and the impulse response stays as positive most of the 
time during the first year. With consumption the coefficients receive quite low coeffi-
cient values however. For instance the largest impulse response, which is the initial first 
positive spike only suggests a 0,005 per cent increase in consumption if a shock occurs 
in the monetary base.  
The impulse responses of the MBS –and US treasury yields seem to show quite similar 
results as their regression models did. A shock in the amounts of MBS-securities under 
the Fed’s balance sheet seem to cause high variance in the MBS-yields during the first 
12 months, but the positive and negative reactions seem to cancel each other out as the 
time line advances. The reaction in the 10-year US treasury yields seems to give a 
stronger trend line during the first year and indeed suggest the reaction in the treasury 
yields to be negative, as the Fed would hope. After the first year the impulse response 
still shows signs of a negative effects on the treasury yields and the overall response 
seems to be negative. In both, MBS and US treasury VAR-models, the coefficient val-
ues stay relatively low. In MBSs the shock variance stays between 0,0003 and -0,0003 
unit effect and between 0,0005 and -0,0005 with the US treasuries.  
As the VAR-results concerning the mortgage rate developments, the impulse responses 
for housing prices and new home sales do not give consistent results to support the 
Fed’s goals for its quantitative easing programs. The initial responses for a shock in 
monetary base do signal a slight positive reaction, but this reaction is reversed in under 
five months in both cases. In the house price VAR-model the positive reaction peaks at 
0,0007 per cent change and at 0,01 per cent with the new home sales. In housing prices 
the downward response trend starts at five month and end at ten-month point, where it 
starts to rise up once again. The first five months of the new home sales VAR include a 
downward spike reaching 0,025 per cent and after that the impulse response fluctuates 
around zero for the rest of the examination period.  
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Figure 7. VAR-models’ impulse responses  
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6. Results analysis and discussion 
 
This chapter is dedicated for analysing and discussing the results from the different re-
gression analyses and the VAR-models that were presented in the previous sub-
chapters. Because the Fed’s quantitative easing program and the zero bound interest rate 
policy was something that had never been seen in the US monetary policy, it is im-
portant to evaluate how effective the policies have been according to the results in con-
trast with the objectives the central bank has presented.  
 
5.1. MBSs  and US treasury bonds 
 
With the MBS –and US Treasury bond purchases the Fed was directly aiming to affect 
the pricing of these securities on the markets. This would be achieved if the Fed were to 
be successful enough in adjusting their supply and demand balance on the markets and 
affecting the securities’ yield levels. (Board of Governors (2008b); (2010); (2011) & 
Bernanke (2012)). The results of regression model eight and nine do show evidence that 
the MBS –and treasury purchases have explained a significant amount of the fluctua-
tions in the 30-year MBS-security and US treasury yields over the sample period of 
2009 till 2016. However the results do not give strong proof that the effects of the pur-
chases have been consistently driving the yields towards lower levels. The LRP-
coefficient for the US treasuries is negative as the Fed would hope, but for MBSs it is 
positive. Many other factors affect the MBS-yields in the markets and since the sample 
period is quite long also, raising concerns about the MBS coefficient’s sign is not 
straightforward but it still raises distress about the MBS-purchases effectiveness on the 
securities yields over the long run. Figure eight illustrates the real developments of the 
MBS and US Treasury yields during the sample period. Figure eight indeed shows that 
the overall trend in the yields has been downward sloping, but as the regression and 
VAR-results suggested, there has been a lot of variance and inconsistencies in the de-
velopments of the yields. As can be seen in figure eight, the treasury yields has approx-
imately dropped by two per cent from the beginning of the sample period from 2009 till 
2016, whereas the MBS yields have only moved down by one per cent. In other words 
the treasury yields have dropped by ten per cent more than MBSs.  
Since the regression that studied the treasury yields gave a higher R-squared results and 
more consistent VAR results with a hoped sign for the LRP-coefficient as well, it can be 
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valid to say that the response of the Fed’s actions on treasury yields have been more 
efficient than on the MBSs. This can be due to the fact that the markets for US treasur-
ies are much larger and more liquid, which can promote more effective responses over 
short and long term periods. On the other hand the results did show many inconsisten-
cies in the effects of the asset purchases. Figure eight also shows that the red and blue 
yield lines have fluctuated quite a lot during the sample period. The variance of the lines 
has been especially strong during the first years of the QE-programs. What can be seen 
noteworthy in figure eight is that there have been quite a lot of movements in the yield 
trends already before the announcements of the QE2 and QE3 –programs, which oc-
curred in late 2010 and 2011. The earlier discussion about how investors’ expectations 
affect the yield curves significantly might offer some explanation for these movements. 
Even though the Fed makes official announcements of its monetary policy in official 
press releases, it does discuss its policy conduct regularly in the press through many 
different channels and the markets try to interpret all available information quickly and 
make forecasts on the Fed’s policy beforehand already. This might explain why the 
yield levels have already dropped before the announcements of QE2 and QE3, which 
happened in late 2010 and 2011.  
What might be concerning according to the regression results and what can be seen in 
figure eight are the upward swings in the yields after the announcements and initiations 
of QE2 and QE3 –programs. Wright (2012) suggests that the quick reversal in the yields 
could have happened either due to a quick recovery in the economical factors the Fed 
wanted to influence, or because the initial drop in the yields was exaggerated. The re-
sults of this study did not show any evidence to support quick recovering effects for the 
US economy due to the QE or zero bound interest rate policies. Chung (2011) and 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) have studied the short-term effects of the 
QE announcements and also suggest very minimal affects for the programs on the short-
term. In other words it could very well be possible that some over reactions have oc-
curred in the MBS and treasury markets around the announcements of the QE-
programs. Since the QE-programs were very large and unseen actions by the central 
bank, large and possible overreactions are not completely irrational phenomena, since 
the markets did not have many benchmarks to compare the possible outcomes of the QE 
programs to beforehand. When the Fed announced the initiation of the QE3-program in 
late 2011, the markets did already have some comparable data in use from the previous 
programs, and indeed the market fluctuations have not been as steep during the first 
year of the QE3-program.  
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Figure 8. 30-year MBS & US Treasury Yields-to-maturity during 2009 and 2016 
 
5.2. Housing markets 
 
Tables four through six illustrate the results for the regressions that studied the Fed’s 
QE programs’ effects on the housing markets. The Fed especially emphasized three 
aspects about the markets, which it wanted to influence and these were the average 
mortgage rates, new home sales and the general house prices. Considering the results 
for the developments of mortgage rates, the QE programs do not seem to have explained 
a significant proportion of the rate movements and the coefficients do not have expected 
negative signs. This might be concerning considering the Fed’s intentions to promote 
growth for the mortgage markets. Figure nine gives some support for this finding since 
it can be seen that the green line illustrating the development of the mortgage rate dur-
ing the sample period has been quite slow during the first years of the QE-programs, 
and has started to decrease more strongly not until two years after QE1. 
The results for the general house price index in table five indicate a same type of small 
short-term effect of QE for housing prices, since the coefficients tend to have quite 
small but positive values. The fact that the coefficient values turn into to negative terri-
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tory in the six and seven month lags might be concerning for the central bank’s policy’s 
credibility since they suggest that in half a year QE tends to have negative effects for 
the development of the house price index. This conclusion might find some support 
from figure nine. As can be seen the red line for house price index actually stays on a 
negative trend all the way up until 2013 and tends to have modest up -and downward 
fluctuations in it. It could be therefore said that the QE-programs have not been very 
effective in supporting the housing markets’ development especially in the first four 
years of the program. However the overall market environment in the first years of the 
asset purchasing programs was challenging and therefore a sudden and strong upward 
trend might not be an outcome that is justified to expect.  
Williamson (2015) also offers another possibility for the slow movements in the mort-
gage rate and housing price developments. Williamson discusses the practical regime of 
how the excess cash that QE is supposed to channel to the markets might not have been 
working properly during the QE-programs. Bernanke (2012) describes how the natural 
idea of the QE programs is not to simply print money and inject it to the markets. He 
points out that when the Fed purchases assets, it pays for them by injecting more cash 
onto the private banks’ reserves accounts at their own central bank reserve accounts. 
Therefore according to Bernanke the Fed is simply creating more central bank reserves 
and not creating more currency. Williamson challenges this view by pointing out that if 
the excess reserves created through QE simply sit on the reserve accounts and are not 
put into use by the private banks, the asset purchases might not have any affect for the 
economy at all. Considering that the financial markets were suffering from a volatile 
period of the recession and uncertainty especially in the early years of the QE-programs, 
Williamson’s argument might have some merit. It may have indeed been that even 
though excess reserves were created for the private banking sector, the banks might 
have been quite reluctant to increase their lending for the weak housing markets and 
increase their risk levels by lowering their rates in mortgage lending.  
Williamson’s claims and the weak overall market environment during the early years of 
the QE-programs might explain why it took so long for the markets of new home sales 
to pick up as well. Figure nine shows that the early years of the QE-programs have been 
quite volatile in the new home sales markets and only in 2012 the number of new homes 
sold has exceeded the amount of the comparison month’s sales and moved into a 
stronger growth path. As can be seen from table six the first month lag does have a posi-
tive sign and suggests more than one per cent rise in new home sales when the monetary 
base grows by one per cent. This could implicate a positive reaction in the eyes of the 
Fed, but the other significant coefficients have negative signs and show a reversing ef-
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fect for QE. This can also be seen in figure nine in the highly volatile first years of the 
new home markets, illustrated by the blue line. While the R-squared values remain quite 
low for table six, and the VAR-model figure shows no conclusive results, it may be 
granted to say that QE has not indeed been significant enough during the first years of 
the recession to promote better markets for new home sales.  
Looking into the VAR-results more closely, more conclusions on the possible weak 
connection of the QE-programs and the housing markets can be drawn. For instance the 
figure for the mortgage rate impulse response shows an initial positive shock in mort-
gage rates for a positive shock in money supply. This is not what the Fed would hope 
but may be rational when considering that the mortgage markets were indeed one of the 
main sources for the whole financial crisis. The overall weakness in the mortgage mar-
kets may have been a too large of a risk for the banking sector to react to the QE by 
lowering their mortgage lending rates, which may explain the long lag for the rates to 
come down. On the other hand the VAR-model for the house price index might suggest 
that the markets were not drawing consistent conclusions when the Fed was adding 
more QE-injections during the years of the monetary easing. Yu (2016) mentions that 
even though the first asset purchases might have been received well in the markets, the 
positive expectations for the future and for the effectiveness of the QE-programs might 
have worn off when the markets were struggling for so many years and the central bank 
had to initiate many new rounds of asset purchase programs.  
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Figure 9. US average mortgage rate (left), new home sales and S&P/Case-Schiller na-
tional home price index (right) 
 
5.3. Inflation, consumption and credit markets 
 
During the sample period of this study, inflation has tended to feature in all of the press 
releases that the Fed has reported alongside the reports of the quantitative easing pro-
grams. The Fed has repeatedly informed that promoting higher and steadier inflation 
growth has been one of its key targets to reach with its unconventional monetary policy 
after the financial crisis. Promoting a steady inflation level of two per cent is included in 
the Fed’s duel mandate alongside with maximum employment so it is not surprising that 
inflation was one of the key factors to influence since the bursting of the financial crisis 
caused the inflation rate to plummet down to minus two per cent in the midst of the cri-
sis as can be seen in figure ten. Considering that the Fed aims to maintain the inflation 
of the US economy on steady levels, figure ten shows that this has been a challenge 
since a lot of variance can be seen in the blue line representing the change in the con-
0,0	20,0	
40,0	60,0	
80,0	100,0	
120,0	140,0	
160,0	180,0	
200,0	
0,00	
1,00	
2,00	
3,00	
4,00	
5,00	
6,00	%	 Mortgage	Rate,	New	Home	Sales	&	House	Price	Index	2009-2016	
Mortgage	Rate	New	Homes	Sold	HPI	
 61 
sumer price index. Considering that this high variance in the inflation rate has existed 
during the sample period of 2009 till 2016, it is not necessarily surprising that the re-
sults of this study do not give conclusive results for the Fed’s unconventional monetary 
policy’s influence to the inflation rate.  
The results found in table one for the regression studying the connection between the 
QE-programs and inflation did not give expected nor high signs for the coefficients that 
would give proof for a strong relationship between the size of the monetary base and the 
inflation rate. Coefficients in regression 12 on the other hand gave higher values and 
indicated an expected inverse relationship between the Fed Funds Rate and the inflation 
rate. The overall coefficient for the regression implied a 0,7 per cent rise in inflation if 
the Fed Funds Rate were to decline by one unit. The one-month lag coefficient gave an 
even higher effect of a two per cent reaction for the inflation rate. Coefficient wise it 
seems that a stronger relationship would have existed between the main directing inter-
est rate and inflation than with the monetary base. The R-squared coefficients remained 
much lower however with the Fed Funds Rate regression than with the monetary base 
equation. The results imply that the monetary base explained around 30 per cent of the 
variance in inflation while the Fed Funds Rate only explained fewer than 20 per cent of 
the variance. All together it can be concluded that even though the results give some 
evidence that the Fed Funds Rate may have had an impact on the fluctuations in the 
inflation rate, the low R-squared values in both regressions and the high variant infla-
tion trend in figure ten would suggest that other economical factors may have been driv-
ing the developments of the inflation rate in a stronger manner after the financial crisis.  
Analysis of the results for the regression three studying the connection between mone-
tary base and the amount of total credit lent out by the private banking sector in the US 
might show some merit once more for Willamson’s (2015) argument about the unused 
assets on the banks’ reserve accounts. While the purpose of the QE programs was to 
enable banks to lend out more loans for the private sector as more liquidity would be 
freed when the central bank makes asset purchases from the banks, lending activity has 
not seemed to respond as positively as the central bank probably would have hoped. As 
can be seen in figure ten, the total amount of credit lent out in the US either decreased 
or only grew under two per cent up until the beginning of 2012. In other words it took 
three years either for the QE-programs to start promoting more steady lending activity 
or again the QE-programs have not succeeded in being a sufficient force driving the 
credit markets to higher levels.  
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Table two could provide proof for the latter explanation to be more accurate. While the 
R-squared values suggest that the monetary base has explained around 40 per cent of 
the variance in the amount of credit in the US during the sample period, the coefficient 
values imply that there has actually been a negative correlation between the two factors. 
This could mean that even though the banks have received more liquidity from the Fed 
through the asset purchases the banks have not channelled this forward as new loans for 
the private sector. Whether this is due to a lack in demand for new loans from the pri-
vate sector or a reluctance of the banks to offer new loans, this could also bring some 
explanation to the poor results that were found for the connection of QE and inflation. 
After all for the QE to promote higher levels of inflation, the excess cash and liquidity 
needs to transfer through to the financial system for households and businesses to pro-
mote higher consumption and investment activity. Williamson (2015) stated that if the 
excess liquidity generated through QE just means cash sitting on the reserve accounts at 
the central bank, QE might not generate any growth in the factors the Fed would want to 
promote.   
Lastly figure ten shows that consumption seems to have picked up much faster from its 
lowest levels after the crisis than the amount of credit has. Even though the Fed has in-
formed precisely that promoting more credit was a key way to accelerate more con-
sumption and more inflation, the amount of credit seems to have been the lagging factor 
out of these three. Table three gives no conclusive explanation that QE would have been 
responsible for the growth in consumption no more than the amount of credit. The equa-
tion four gives out a negative coefficient for the monetary base variable suggesting a 
negative relationship between a growth in monetary base and consumption and the R-
squared values remain quite low. While the initial impulse response in the consumption 
VAR-model seems to result in a positive spike for a short period, the response tends to 
remain on a very moderate level as well. Hence worth it seems that neither QE nor the 
amount of credit have been the driving forces behind the developments of consumption 
in the US.  
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Figure 10. Consumer price index, personal consumption and total bank credit in the 
US, per cent changes from previous year   
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7. Conclusions 
 
The financial crisis proved to be a challenge for the Federal Reserve that its convention-
al monetary tools were not sufficient to solve. In order to solve the credit crunch in the 
financial sector and avoid a complete systemic failure of the economy, the central bank 
started adjusting its monetary policy regime aggressively. Quantitative easing and zero 
bound interest rate policies were initiated and continued for many years also to promote 
better environment for consumption, inflation, real estate and securities markets. Given 
that the time of unconventional monetary policy has lasted for so many years in the US, 
and considering the benchmark experiences of Japan’s and Eurozone’s unconventional 
monetary policies, the results of this study showing weak overall connections between 
QE and zero bound interest rate policies and better economic recovery are perhaps not 
that surprising.  
According to the results of this study, the US securities and MBS yields seemed to have 
the strongest reactions for the asset purchases and the zero interest rate policy but the 
findings still did not provide a hoped consistent trend change in the securities yields that 
the Fed would have hoped for. Considering the developments in the housing markets 
after the financial crisis, the results imply a high possibility for the fact that other eco-
nomical factors have dominated over the monetary policy actions during the first years 
after the crisis. The results for an expected inverse relationship between mortgage rates 
and QE were weak, and the rates for mortgage loans do not seem to have responded 
quickly enough and have not decreased sufficiently to promote recovery for new home 
sales or a general rise in house prices.  
The results that were achieved for the responses of credit levels in contrast with the ex-
pansion in the monetary base may actually offer one of the most valuable implications 
for the overall results of this study. Given that promoting higher levels of credit was one 
of the key goals for the Fed to achieve with the QE –and zero bound interest rate poli-
cies, the fact that the results actually offer a negative correlation between an expansion 
in monetary base and levels of credit can be high of significance. Since the coefficients 
for the monetary base in the short –and long term were negative but while the R-squared 
values were quite high, the argument for poor credit transferring effect can be made. In 
practice this means that it may very well be true that the private banking sector has not 
acted in the way the central bank has hoped for, and the banks have not created enough 
of new excess credit especially in the first years following the crisis. If the excess re-
serves have been sitting on the reserve accounts as Williamson (2015) and Bernanke 
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(2012) have said, the lacking credit expansion could have prevented a consistent in-
crease in consumption, inflation and housing market activity. 
Considering that the overall objective of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy after the financial crisis, the results that 
showed weak responses for QE and zero bound interest rates policies can offer very 
valuable information for the future use of such policy regimes. Given that this was the 
first time that the Federal Reserve initiated these sorts of policies, the most efficient 
execution can not be expected to be easy or simple and the results of this study’s sample 
period’s economic recovery are a valuable lesson for the future recessions to come. All 
together it seems that QE-policies can be justified and effective for adjusting weak envi-
ronments in bond -and other securities markets, other structural issues within an econo-
my may be too dominant forces during recessions and neither QE or low interest rate 
policies may be enough to ensure a swift recovery in inflation, credit or housing.  
For future monetary policy regime it is also noteworthy to assess the risks associated 
with the unconventional policies that were practised after the financial crisis. Even 
though an economy might not recover as quickly as policy makers would hope after a 
recession as seemed to happen after the financial crisis, continuing extremely easy mon-
etary policy conduct can actually create more risks than solutions with it. If the prob-
lems in economic growth are structural and not effectively responsive to monetary poli-
cy adjustments as suggested by the results of this study, a central bank may put itself in 
a vulnerable position if it continues to practice the types of levels of easy monetary pol-
icy for seven years or more as was seen in the sample period of this study. If a new eco-
nomic shock or a recession were to strike while the monetary policy regime is already 
near its most easy levels, the central bank would have little room to ease its policies any 
more, and the end results could be dangerous. In addition keeping directing interest 
rates at zero for many years can mean that different asset markets such as equities and 
bonds may begin to form valuation bubbles, which could drive the economy back into 
recession as has happened many times in the US before. For instance a stock market 
crash in zero interest rate environment would mean that investors would simultaneously 
loose their asset values from equities, but would not have any protection from fixed 
income assets, since bond yields would be at low levels already as well.  
In summary this study’s concluding remarks are that QE and zero interest rates can be 
justified responses for extreme levels of systemic economical shocks, but an extended 
period of their usage for many years and the economical factors that are reported as the 
policy’s targets should be considered in the future. In addition it should be said that fu-
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ture research of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy is still needed after the cen-
tral bank has managed to reverse all of its QE actions by shrinking down its balance 
sheet from the assets it has acquired during the programs and after the Fed Funds Rate 
has returned on its long-term average levels. Only then it can be concluded whether a 
long period of easy monetary policy did not cause too large undesired phenomena in the 
economy after the programs were reversed. If however the Fed were to have problems 
in shrinking its balance sheet or raising the Fed Funds Rate, it is crucial to study why 
that was so that overall judgements about unconventional monetary policy actions can 
be concluded.  
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Appendix 2.  Regression and VAR-model data 
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475421 
6751 
149,38 
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9792,1 
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214,8 
631680 
462021 
149,82 
5,42 
117,0 
7064,8 
9807,6 
01/07/2009 
1673598 
0,16 
3,56 
3,84 
214,7 
681897 
539414 
150,77 
5,22 
122,3 
6938,5 
9835,2 
01/08/2009 
1710773 
0,16 
3,59 
3,83 
215,4 
728817 
605162 
150,69 
5,19 
124,4 
6850,9 
9961,9 
01/09/2009 
1801165 
0,15 
3,40 
3,62 
215,9 
761042 
690826 
149,65 
5,06 
114,9 
6760,6 
9875,4 
01/10/2009 
1936314 
0,12 
3,39 
3,61 
216,5 
772673 
772080 
148,60 
4,95 
117,9 
6670,0 
9924,6 
01/11/2009 
2024608 
0,12 
3,40 
3,29 
217,2 
776524 
836245 
147,96 
4,88 
111,6 
6731,8 
9946,1 
01/12/2009 
2026220 
0,12 
3,59 
4,26 
217,3 
776565 
907165 
146,69 
4,93 
104,8 
6674,1 
10000,6 
01/01/2010 
1994962 
0,11 
3,73 
3,84 
217,5 
776607 
969887 
145,00 
5,03 
102,7 
6603,9 
10003,4 
01/02/2010 
2115182 
0,13 
3,69 
3,84 
217,3 
776582 
1015449 
143,06 
4,99 
100,0 
6537,9 
10034,7 
01/03/2010 
2079591 
0,16 
3,73 
4,02 
217,4 
776629 
1061369 
143,60 
4,97 
113,4 
6595,3 
10095,5 
01/04/2010 
2014449 
0,20 
3,85 
3,94 
217,4 
776713 
1099409 
145,39 
5,10 
125,6 
6922,9 
10106,9 
01/05/2010 
2012331 
0,20 
3,42 
3,58 
217,3 
776813 
1111091 
147,02 
4,89 
83,3 
6888,9 
10140,2 
01/06/2010 
2002433 
0,18 
3,20 
3,00 
217,2 
776951 
1121270 
147,69 
4,74 
90,8 
6862,7 
10165,9 
01/07/2010 
1994298 
0,18 
3,01 
2,60 
217,6 
777009 
1122090 
147,54 
4,56 
84,2 
6834,6 
10184,3 
01/08/2010 
1993664 
0,19 
2,70 
2,47 
217,9 
779519 
1109703 
146,40 
4,43 
83,9 
6827,9 
10247,1 
01/09/2010 
1961226 
0,19 
2,65 
3,08 
218,3 
797520 
1091454 
144,59 
4,35 
94,3 
6801,4 
10268,9 
01/10/2010 
1961720 
0,19 
2,54 
2,95 
219,0 
827549 
1064981 
143,12 
4,23 
86,6 
6793,3 
10343,7 
01/11/2010 
1973139 
0,19 
2,76 
3,25 
219,6 
867476 
1037443 
141,82 
4,30 
85,4 
6778,3 
10399,8 
01/12/2010 
2017000 
0,18 
3,29 
3,67 
220,5 
971591 
1008010 
140,63 
4,71 
97,0 
6763,2 
10436,1 
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Date
M
onetary	base
Fed	Funds	Rate
10-year	US	
Treasury	yield
30-year	M
BS	yield
CPI	(inflation)
Treasuries	at	Fed
M
BS	held	by	Fed
Hom
e	Price	Index
M
ortgage	Rate
New	Hom
es	Sold
Total	Credit
Consum
ption
01/01/2011
2047917
0,17
3,39
3,74
221,2
1071768
978919
139,05
4,76
91,4
6743,2
10474,7
01/02/2011
2211605
0,16
3,58
3,78
221,9
1177255
957664
137,74
4,95
80,4
6717,8
10512,4
01/03/2011
2395330
0,14
3,41
3,85
223,0
1284279
943510
137,79
4,84
89,3
6695,4
10583,5
01/04/2011
2496574
0,10
3,46
3,58
224,1
1387216
933639
139,15
4,84
92,3
6710,4
10624,6
01/05/2011
2567185
0,09
3,17
3,62
224,8
1480639
922667
140,68
4,64
90,8
6714,9
10653,1
01/06/2011
2648548
0,09
3,00
3,72
224,8
1576372
913886
141,93
4,51
89,6
6725,5
10676,4
01/07/2011
2684801
0,07
3,00
3,49
225,4
1631796
904794
142,33
4,55
88,1
6763,4
10727,1
01/08/2011
2657678
0,10
2,30
3,01
226,1
1646769
892887
141,78
4,27
89,0
6795,1
10745,6
01/09/2011
2637680
0,08
1,98
2,97
226,6
1660580
880004
140,16
4,11
90,5
6801,4
10790,6
01/10/2011
2637757
0,07
2,15
3,19
226,8
1672205
863276
138,40
4,07
94,0
6844,4
10827,6
01/11/2011
2605420
0,08
2,01
3,19
227,2
1666995
845525
136,65
3,99
97,6
6904,6
10828,7
01/12/2011
2619586
0,07
1,98
2,91
227,2
1676213
840240
135,16
3,96
101,5
6904,5
10827,3
01/01/2012
2640764
0,08
1,97
2,75
227,9
1656829
840267
134,17
3,92
99,7
6925,3
10905,6
01/02/2012
2694422
0,10
1,97
2,66
228,4
1661681
843224
134,01
3,89
108,9
6998,9
10975,9
01/03/2012
2655219
0,13
2,17
2,76
228,9
1661861
844705
135,89
3,95
105,4
7007,3
10987,2
01/04/2012
2639850
0,14
2,05
2,47
229,3
1672593
844186
138,50
3,91
105,4
7022,4
11017,4
01/05/2012
2616477
0,16
1,80
2,40
228,7
1660772
854716
141,08
3,80
110,1
7059,9
11010,3
01/06/2012
2618755
0,16
1,62
2,37
228,5
1663639
859870
143,20
3,68
107,1
7086,9
10997,4
01/07/2012
2647752
0,16
1,53
2,04
228,5
1657285
856288
144,31
3,55
109,8
7096,9
11034,9
01/08/2012
2650750
0,13
1,68
2,10
229,8
1644927
855109
144,73
3,60
111,6
7121,2
11054,9
01/09/2012
2594909
0,14
1,72
1,86
231,0
1648554
845294
144,39
3,50
114,6
7149,0
11131,0
01/10/2012
2611775
0,16
1,75
2,09
231,7
1651525
847070
144,00
3,38
106,5
7163,0
11144,7
01/11/2012
2646809
0,16
1,65
2,19
231,3
1651314
873426
144,00
3,35
116,7
7195,6
11161,7
01/12/2012
2675945
0,16
1,72
2,16
231,3
1657545
907344
143,91
3,35
118,8
7213,6
11186,5
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Date
M
onetary	base
Fed	Funds	Rate
10-year	US	
Treasury	yield
30-year	M
BS	yield
CPI	(inflation)
Treasuries	at	Fed
M
BS	held	by	Fed
Home	Price	Index
M
ortgage	Rate
New	Homes	Sold
Total	Credit
Consumption
01/01/2013
2741743
0,14
1,91
2,54
231,6
1687612
931892
144,35
3,41
131,5
7255,8
11225,4
01/02/2013
2845251
0,15
1,98
2,41
233,0
1732915
991444
145,19
3,53
130,7
7270,2
11283,0
01/03/2013
2935036
0,14
1,96
2,49
232,3
1777715
1044558
147,99
3,57
133,6
7271,8
11261,6
01/04/2013
3011737
0,15
1,76
2,22
231,9
1820348
1084777
151,02
3,45
134,2
7292,8
11253,9
01/05/2013
3116932
0,11
1,93
2,95
231,9
1865508
1141675
153,92
3,54
128,0
7297,8
11279,5
01/06/2013
3201472
0,09
2,30
3,28
232,4
1912803
1175978
156,49
4,07
137,8
7307,6
11320,2
01/07/2013
3290898
0,09
2,58
3,35
232,7
1961858
1214734
158,35
4,37
111,9
7316,4
11343,1
01/08/2013
3398930
0,08
2,74
3,49
233,2
2007562
1263672
159,46
4,46
113,1
7311,5
11370,2
01/09/2013
3486920
0,08
2,81
3,22
233,6
2047109
1303434
159,74
4,49
118,8
7332,8
11423,9
01/10/2013
3589515
0,09
2,62
3,09
233,8
2096585
1353511
159,63
4,19
132,1
7356,9
11465,2
01/11/2013
3684563
0,08
2,72
3,29
234,2
2144303
1405652
159,44
4,26
132,7
7372,9
11542,0
01/12/2013
3717450
0,09
2,90
3,47
234,8
2190407
1456395
159,36
4,46
131,3
7377,1
11566,0
01/01/2014
3728483
0,07
2,86
3,30
235,4
2223452
1500619
159,46
4,43
133,0
7405,9
11562,2
01/02/2014
3833354
0,07
2,71
3,17
235,6
2265050
1534041
159,96
4,30
125,9
7463,8
11631,4
01/03/2014
3885877
0,08
2,72
3,23
235,9
2300431
1569749
161,28
4,34
122,0
7529,5
11714,6
01/04/2014
3930681
0,09
2,71
3,12
236,5
2334954
1608986
163,06
4,34
119,3
7572,9
11757,1
01/05/2014
3911525
0,09
2,56
2,89
236,8
2363551
1639729
164,78
4,19
134,5
7622,9
11790,1
01/06/2014
3948691
0,10
2,60
2,87
237,0
2388109
1649946
166,30
4,16
123,8
7670,0
11854,4
01/07/2014
3989084
0,09
2,54
2,87
237,3
2411465
1667412
167,22
4,13
119,6
7725,1
11878,5
01/08/2014
4075039
0,09
2,42
2,79
237,2
2429385
1680391
167,53
4,12
133,6
7772,5
11965,9
01/09/2014
4049189
0,09
2,53
2,86
237,5
2443205
1679213
167,33
4,16
138,7
7796,2
11978,6
01/10/2014
4001451
0,09
2,30
2,61
237,7
2456463
1699907
167,00
4,04
141,1
7830,1
12049,5
01/11/2014
3830424
0,09
2,33
2,59
237,3
2461613
1716520
166,75
4,00
132,7
7885,9
12095,7
01/12/2014
3934455
0,12
2,21
2,49
236,5
2461493
1731074
166,56
3,86
146,4
7924,6
12082,4
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Date
M
onetary	base
Fed	Funds	Rate
10-year	US	
Treasury	yield
30-year	M
BS	yield
CPI	(inflation)
Treasuries	at	Fed
M
BS	held	by	Fed
Home	Price	Index
M
ortgage	Rate
New	Homes	Sold
Total	Credit
Consumption
01/01/2015
4017103
0,11
1,88
2,33
235,0
2461014
1740752
166,35
3,71
156,0
7997,4
12056,3
01/02/2015
3840464
0,11
1,98
2,33
235,4
2460409
1743663
166,75
3,71
163,4
8037,6
12087,5
01/03/2015
4030632
0,11
2,04
2,40
235,9
2459847
1742428
168,21
3,77
145,8
8112,7
12152,9
01/04/2015
4059374
0,12
1,94
2,23
236,2
2459806
1735420
170,10
3,67
148,8
8183,4
12181,0
01/05/2015
3949372
0,12
2,20
2,45
236,9
2460410
1727303
171,99
3,84
150,9
8213,9
12257,7
01/06/2015
3919649
0,13
2,36
2,69
237,4
2460830
1729722
173,60
3,98
140,5
8249,1
12281,8
01/07/2015
3961217
0,13
2,32
2,76
237,7
2461238
1737848
174,66
4,05
148,2
8321,3
12327,9
01/08/2015
3984019
0,14
2,17
2,64
237,7
2461740
1740741
175,11
3,91
150,3
8355,4
12355,6
01/09/2015
4028486
0,14
2,17
2,62
237,5
2461944
1738592
175,23
3,89
136,0
8395,1
12387,2
01/10/2015
4060469
0,12
2,07
2,51
237,9
2461856
1745055
175,25
3,80
142,3
8453,4
12402,1
01/11/2015
4006725
0,12
2,26
2,68
238,3
2461696
1749970
175,36
3,94
151,2
8508,7
12442,4
01/12/2015
3835810
0,24
2,24
2,75
238,0
2461578
1746796
175,34
3,96
160,1
8565,6
12471,8
01/01/2016
3792723
0,34
2,09
2,70
238,1
2461423
1750129
175,28
3,87
156,5
8623,0
12479,1
01/02/2016
3872483
0,38
1,78
2,41
237,7
2461184
1749809
175,52
3,66
156,3
8683,7
12504,3
01/03/2016
3898431
0,36
1,89
2,44
237,9
2461239
1753424
176,84
3,69
159,8
01/04/2016
3872939
0,37
1,81
2,33
238,9
2461379
1755803
178,73
3,61
169,6
01/05/2016
3836501
0,37
1,81
2,32
239,4
2461613
1753848
180,63
3,60
168,5
01/06/2016
3825373
0,38
1,64
2,27
239,9
2462032
1746427
182,19
3,57
166,1
01/07/2016
3772402
0,39
1,50
2,06
239,8
2462596
1749113
183,43
3,44
185,1
Source: The Federal Reserve of St. Louis (2017) 
